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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the origins, growth, and legitimization of the standardized test
preparation (“test-prep”) industry from the late 1940s to the end of the 1980s. In particular, this
thesis focuses on the development of Stanley H. Kaplan Education Centers, Ltd. (“Kaplan”) and
The Princeton Review (“TPR”), and how these companies were most conducive in making the
test-prep industry and standardized test-preparation itself socially acceptable. The standardized
test most frequently discussed in this thesis is the Scholastic Aptitude Test (“SAT”), especially
after its development came under the control of Educational Testing Service (“ETS”), but due
attention is also given to the American College Testing Program (“ACT”).
This thesis argues that certain test-prep companies gained legitimacy by successfully
manipulating the interstices of American business and education, and brokered legitimacy
through the rhetorical devices in their advertising. However, the legitimacy for the industry atlarge was gained by default as neither the American government nor the American public could
conclusively demonstrate that the industry conducted wholesale fraud. The thesis also argues that
standardized test manufacturers were forced to engage in a cat-and-mouse game of pseudoantagonism and adaptation with the test-prep industry once truth-in-testing laws prescribed
transparent operations in standardized testing. These developments affect the current state of
American standardized testing, its fluctuating but ubiquitous presence in the college admissions
process, and the perpetuation of the test-prep industry decades after its origins.
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INTRODUCTION: ACADEMIC RATIONALITY

Proper education is a touchy subject in American society. The sheer vagueness of the
concept prompts constant argument over what a solid education needs to encompass, how such
education ought to be structured, and why existing structures need to be reformed. A cynical
question lies beneath: who will—and who will not or cannot—benefit from such change? At its
core, this debate bandies between the discordant perceptions of education as a consumable good
and education as a necessary service; how does education reconcile itself amidst shifting societal,
political, economic, and cultural agendas? More so, how do our constructs of proper education
dictate our ideas on the relationship between youth, adolescence, and adulthood?1
Currently, the debate over proper education revolves around the vast growth of for-profit
post-secondary education. With increased fervor, for-profit institutes such as the University of
Phoenix, DeVry, and Kaplan University are gaining educational accreditation, sometimes
1

No footnote can accurately cover the breadth of solid scholarship on American education, even if one
cordons the list to research on Progressive and post-Progressive education in the United States. However, if one
wishes to read some texts on this topic, please see: Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle
Class and the Development of Higher Education in America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1976); Jo Ann,
Boydston, ed., John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, vol. 1 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
1981); Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957
(New York: Vintage Books, 1961); Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the
Social Forces that Have Shaped the Administration of the Public Schools (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962); Abraham Flexner, The American College: A Criticism (New York: The Century Company, 1908); Susan J.
Matt, "Children's Envy and the Emergence of the Modern Consumer Ethic," Journal of Social History 36, no. 2
(Winter 2002): 283-302, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3790111 (accessed April 1, 2010); Mark R. Nemec, Ivory
Towers and Nationalist Minds: Universities, Leadership, and the Development of the American State (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2006); John Parringer, John Dewey and the Paradox of Liberal Reform (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1990); and Julie A. Reuben, "Beyond Politics: Community Civics and the
Redefinition of Citizenship in the Progressive Era,‖ History of Education Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 399420, http://www.jstor.org/stable/369872 (accessed April 1, 2010).

1

through the acquisition of schools with standing credentials.2 In turn, more Americans are
seeking an education at these institutions. At the turn of this century, for-profit and proprietary
institutions conferred slightly more than 20,000 baccalaureate degrees, accounting for merely
1.6% of all BA degrees awarded for that year.3 By the 2008-2009 academic year, enrollment at
“[the ten] largest publicly traded for-profit higher-education companies” had been calculated to
surpass 1,160,000 students. 4 When adjusted to include Kaplan University (which is technically a
subsidiary), these figures exceed 1,250,000. Although figures for school enrollment by no means
equate to figures for degrees conferred, one may infer that students are far more likely than ever
to seek an education at a proprietary institution.
The author Anya Kamenetz asserts that for-profit and proprietary institutions are
revolutionizing the concept of American higher education much like agricultural and
engineering-focused land-grant colleges did two centuries prior. Further, “[t]he same kinds of
controversies […over disrupting…] the classical curriculum” are erupting as scholars and

2

Goldie Blumenstyk, ―Expanding Its Reach in Higher Education, Kaplan Buys Chain of Commercial
Colleges,‖ Chronicle of Higher Education online edition, July 7, 2010, http://chronicle.com/article/Expanding-ItsReach-in-Higher/10526/ (accessed October 25, 2010); Goldie Blumenstyk, ―Kaplan Moves Beyond Test Preparation
With Purchases of For-Profit Colleges,‖ Chronicle of Higher Education online edition, February 15, 2002,
http://chronicle.com/article/Kaplan-Moves-Beyond-Test/4253 (accessed October 25, 2010). The breadth of
writing—scholarly, journalistic, and otherwise—on for-profit education has also become quite expansive since the
turn of the century. One useful source for news and commentary on for-profit education is digital archive of the
online version of The Chronicle of Higher Education (http://chronicle.com).
3

David W. Breneman, Brian Pusser, and Sarah E. Turner, ―The Contemporary of For-Profit Higher
Education: Mapping the Competitive Market,‖ in Earnings from Learning: The Rise of For-Profit Universities, eds.
David W. Breneman, Brian Pusser, and Sarah E. Turner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 8.
4

Goldie Blumenstyk and Andrea Fuller, ―Enrollment Growth at 10 For-Profit Colleges, 2008-9,‖ Chronicle
of Higher Education online edition, February 7, 2010, http://www.chronicle.com/article/Chart-Enrollment-Growthat-top-10/64024/ (accessed 24 May, 2010). Five of these companies—Apollo, DeVry, Educational Management
Corporation, ITT, and Strayer—experienced over 400% growth in enrollment between the 1997-1998 and 20082009 academic years. See: ―Major For-Profit Higher-Education Companies,‖ Chronicle of Higher Education online
edition, January 23, 1998, http://chronicle.com/article/Major-For-Profit/99346 (accessed 25 October, 2010).
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theorists question the educational ethics of for-profit universities.5 But, simply comparing past
to present obscures the broader issue at hand: the messily intimate interaction between business
and education throughout American history. The arenas of business and education are fixed in
neither size nor scope, and so one cannot presume that the area of interaction between these two
fields has set constraints on its degree or depth. In turn, certain companies, industries,
pedagogical trends, social phenomena, governmental interventions, and cultural trends have
continuously redrawn this hazy borderline of acceptable and unacceptable interaction between
business and education. Hence, it may be worthwhile to discuss how this space of acceptable
interaction waxes and wanes. By what processes are businesses allowed to undertake educational
goods and services, and by what processes are educational institutions allowed to engage with
the free market? What allowed the for-profit sector of education to become so massive?
The clearest tangible predecessor to contemporary for-profit education is the American
standardized test preparation (or “test-prep”) industry, particularly the field of SAT coaching. As
Goldie Blumenstyk noted in an obituary essay on test-prep magnate Stanley Kaplan, the
businessman “establish[ed] (for better or for worse) that there was money to be made in a
business tied so closely to an essential element of the nonprofit academic mission.”6 Yet, this
prompts a key question: If the test-prep industry created space within the American educational
environment for business-oriented and for-profit enterprises, then what granted the test-prep
5

Anya Kamenetz, interviewed in ―Kaplan University: A For-Profit Take on Education,‖ All Things
Considered, National Public Radio, broadcast May 6, 2010; transcript available through NPR‘s webpage for the
broadcasted story http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126564748 (accessed May 31, 2010). For
another look at Ms. Kamanetz‘s views in an NPR story, please see: ―The Allure of For-Profit Universities Grows,‖
All Things Considered, National Public Radio, broadcast 13 March, 2010; transcript available through NPR‘s
webpage for the broadcasted story http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124655777 (accessed
October 25, 2010).
6

Goldie Blumenstyk, ―Analysis: The Legacy of a Test-Prep Entrepreneur,‖ Chronicle of Higher Education
online edition, August 25, 2009, http://chronicle.com/article/Analysis-The-Legacy-of-a-T/48174/ (accessed May 18,
2010).
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industry its own space within this field? That is, what gave test-prep companies a sense of
legitimacy, and more so, what allowed these companies to broker this sense of legitimacy to
other for-profit enterprises in the American educational sector?
Obviously, the test-prep industry‟s operational legitimacy is generated by the industry to
which it is dependent: the standardized testing industry. Standardized testing is so ubiquitous a
component in contemporary American education that one may have trouble perceiving an
educational environment without it. This is especially true for the SAT (formerly “Scholastic
Aptitude Test”). The exam has been administered to college hopefuls since 1926, initially as a
supplement to the College Entrance Examination Board‟s battery of admission tests.7 However,
the examination did not begin to become an ever-present facet of young Americans‟ lives for
another two decades. In 1947, the College Entrance Examination Board (or “College Board”)
collaborated with the Carnegie Institute in order to form the nonprofit Educational Testing
Service (or “ETS”), which would be responsible for the versions of the SAT taken by the
majority of college-hopeful Americans in the second half of the twentieth century.8 In turn, the
test-prep industry did not truly take off until well after ETS gained predominant oversight of the
development, manufacture, and administration of the SAT.
On the surface, it might be difficult to discern if the test-prep industry ever had a sense of
legitimacy beyond this reason for being. Nonetheless, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze the

7

Mildred Adams, ―Eager Rush of Students Swamps Colleges,‖ New York Times, September 26, 1926:
XX5, accessed and catalogued as such in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007),
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=docview/103663520?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 14, 2011) Do note
that the term ―SAT‖ is no longer an acronym for ―Scholastic Aptitude Test,‖ and simply refers to the exam itself;
see: Rebecca Zwick, ―Higher Education Admission Testing,‖ in Educational Measurement, 4th ed., ed. By Robert L.
Berman (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006): 648.
8

Allan Nairn and associates, The Reign of ETS: The Corporation that Makes Up Minds, (Washington,
D.C.: Ralph Nader, 1980), 1-5.

4

test-prep industry‟s search for and acquisition of legitimacy, and the aftereffects of this endeavor.
The essay will maintain that, in order to establish legitimacy, the test-prep industry had to reorient the relationship between higher education, consumption, and adolescence in American
society. In turn, this thesis will seek to explain how the test-prep industry brokered a sense of
legitimacy within American education as well as American business, and why the industry was
successful in doing so.
This essay shall also make three interrelated arguments. First, the test-prep industry
established business legitimacy by generating and selling the notion of “dream insurance.”9
These companies, most notably Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Centers (or “Kaplan”), used
advertising and rhetoric that merged the realistic and the fantastic in order to convince studentcustomers that their aspirations need not be pipe dreams.10 Test-coaches engaged in a rhetoric
that eschewed business itself, and instead achieved financial success by arguing that one‟s
performance on a standardized aptitude test was indeed alterable through concerted training.11
9

―Display Ad 61,‖ New York Times, January 24, 1970: 14;found and catalogued as such in ProQuest
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007),
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/118700807?accountid=10003 (accessed November 1, 2010).
10

The term ―student-consumer‖ (or ―student consumer‖)—which implies that a student, as a consumer of
educational goods and services in a system with relatively little federalized and centralized regimentation, ought to
be considered and protected similar to those consumers in the broader free market—is not novel to this essay.
Sociologist David Riesman provides cornerstone scholarship and commentary on this concept. Please see: David
Riesman, On Higher Education: The Academic Enterprise in an Era of Rising Student Consumerism (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1981): 105-161. For several historical examples of the term—and a glimpse into its
evolution, please see: ―The Profession: Reports and Opinion,‖ American Sociological Review 24, no. 1 (February
1959): 87-112, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2089588 (accessed November 1, 2010); Harvey J. Goodfriend,
―Viewpoint: The University as a Public Utility,‖ Change 5, no. 2 (March 1973): 9, 61-62,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40161682 (accessed November 3, 2010); David Halliburton, ―Education‘s
Entrepreneurs,‖ Change 10, no. 10 (November 1978): 18-21, http://www.jsotr.org/stable/40177168 (accessed
November 3, 2010); and Gary M. Armstrong, Mertin N. Gurol, and Frederick A. Russ, ―Detecting and Correcting
Deceptive Advertising,‖ Journal of Consumer Research 6, no. 3 (December 1979): 237-246,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2488984 (accessed November 1, 2010).
11

Please see: W.V. Slack and D. Porter, ―The Scholastic Aptitude Test: A Critical Appraisal,‖ Harvard
Educational Review 50, no. 2 (Spring 1980): 154-175; and R. A. Weitzman, ―The Prediction of College
Achievement by the Scholastic Aptitude Test and the High School Record,‖ Journal of Educational Measurement
19, no. 2 (Autumn 1982): 179-191, http://www.jstor.org.stable/1434572 (accessed June 10, 2010).

5

The path of one‟s adolescence need not have dictated the path of one‟s adulthood, and by
purchasing a prep course, one had the chance to alter or undo years of educational neglect.
American adolescents with “quality” high course grades but middling-to-low test scores could
demonstrate that they were indeed not overachieving beyond their natural aptitude. This notion
was in sharp contrast to the beliefs of ETS and the College Board, which maintained that
standardized testing was a fair measure of aptitude, and that students‟ natural abilities could be
easily measured and nurtured along a series of metrics. That is, if standardized testing was
designed to better help “a student […] take from classroom instruction what is suited to his
needs,” then the path of one‟s adulthood could be easily molded by the standardized exams from
one‟s adolescence.12
Secondly, the test-prep industry brokered legitimacy through several channels during the
1960s and 1970s. The first channel was in the legal arena—most notably, New York‟s Truth-inTesting legislation, and the Federal Trade Commission‟s investigation of the test-prep industry.
The second channel was largely cultural, as the American public began to reconsider the validity
of standardized testing, as well as the concepts of aptitude and intelligence. The final channel
was American education at-large. Several experiments in pedagogy during the late 1960‟s and
early 1970‟s challenged the limitations to overt business influence and interaction in primary and
secondary education. Meanwhile, the creation of the Department of Education in the late 1970s
sought to put an expansive corral around the flock of American educational practices. The net
result of this brokerage is that the test-prep industry became acceptable by default. The industry
at-large was deemed legitimate because it was not conclusively illegitimate.

12

Robert Glaser, ―Adapting the Elementary School Curriculum to Individual Performance,‖ in Proceedings
of the 1967 Invitational Conference on Testing Problems (Princeton: Educational Testing Service, 1968), 4.

6

Finally, truth-in-testing legislation changed the relationship between the test-prep
industry and ETS considerably during the 1980s. Both sides began to engage in pseudoantagonism and symbiotic adaptation. Although the test-prep industry existed because of the
standardized tests manufactured by ETS and other companies, test-makers would have been
operating haphazardly had they readily accepted such indirect competition. Following truth-intesting legislation, ETS repeatedly felt compelled to alter the structure of its examinations when
it thought that these tests had become too trainable.13 Further, ETS took litigious measures when
certain test-prep companies provided their clientele with material decidedly too similar to actual
standardized test question. Test-prep companies were thus prompted to alter their techniques in
order to remain viable sources of standardized test preparation as well as avoid copyright
infringement prosecution.
The forced transparency of standardized testing allowed student-customers to place
higher demands upon the test-prep industry, but also allowed the industry to expand rapidly. In
this sense, both ETS and the test prep industry had to operate with mutual beneficence in the
1980s. The more that standardized tests became prerequisites for post-secondary studies or
particular fields of employment, the more the test-prep industry‟s potential clientele base grew.
Conversely, the more people who purchased some form of test-prep, the more potential profits
for ETS, as those who felt more confident to take a standardized test were more likely to actually
take, or retake, it.
13

See: ―Next Year‘s Revised S.A.T. Is Here, and Already Students (and Parents) are Jittery,‖ New York
Times, June 9, 1993: B7, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007)
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/109145336?accountid=10003 (accessed March 1, 2010); Anthony
DePalma, ―Byting the S.A.T.,‖ New York Times, April 7, 1991: EDUC23, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The
New York Times (1851-2007), http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/108627151?accountid=10003
(accessed March 3, 2010); and ―S.A.T. Schedule Will Be Reduced Beginning Jan. 1‖ New York Times, October 10,
1979: B3, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007),
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/123970732?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 14, 2011).

7

Establishing Focus
Whatever validity these arguments have would be jeopardized if certain terms were left
overly plastic and key concepts treated anachronistically. A distinction ought to be made about
what “test-prep industry” will entail within this thesis. Although the publishing arm and
publishing history of the test-prep industry will be discussed throughout the thesis, a greater
focus will be placed on those proprietary enterprises that provide classroom or, perhaps more
aptly, classroom-like instruction to clientele seeking improved performance on standardized
postsecondary entrance exams.
More concretely, Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Centers (“Kaplan”) and The Princeton
Review (“TPR”) will receive the bulk of attention. No other companies in the test-prep industry
have received as much public visibility and scrutiny. Kaplan began as a semi-professional
operation in the late 1930‟s by Stanley H. Kaplan, a Brooklyn resident seeking a form of
employment after being rejected from medical school. Although Kaplan initially prepped
students for the New York State Regent‟s Exam, he would find financial success in SAT
coaching once the exam became widely-used by American colleges and universities.14 By the
1980‟s, the company was the self-professed “world‟s leading test prep organization,” constantly
adding new branches of the business across the country.15 Meanwhile, John Katzman founded
The Princeton Review in the early 1980‟s. Like Kaplan over four decades earlier, Katzman was a
14

Alix M. Freedman, ―Stanley Kaplan, Teacher of Testing,‖ New York Times, September 20, 1981: F8,
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007),
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/121677446?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 14, 2011). See
also: Stanley Kaplan and Anne Farris, Test Pilot: How I Broke Testing Barriers for Millions of Students and Caused
a Sonic Boom in the Business of Education (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 26-31.
15

Display Advertisement, Barnard Bulletin, April 16, 1986: 12, The Barnard Bulletin Digital Archives,
http://www.barnard.edu/archives/bull etin.htm (accessed March 15, 2010). This link appears to be defunct, and it
seems that Barnard‘s extensive digitized archives must be accessed through the URL
http://barnardcollege.newspaperarchive.com/ (accessed March 14, 2011).
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young New York City resident who parlayed a cottage tutoring business into a wildly profitable
enterprise. Unlike Kaplan, Katzman did not have to wait for the SAT to take hold, and so his
business was geared toward SAT coaching from its inception.16
Obviously, the qualification of “standardized test manufacturers” or “test-makers” is
equally important. “Test-makers” will be largely referent to Educational Testing Service (“ETS”)
and the College Entrance Examination Board (“CEEB” or “College Board”). These entities were
responsible for the ubiquity of the SAT in the college admissions process during the latter half of
the twentieth century. Chapter Two will also include a discussion of the American College
Testing Program (“ACT”). Developed in the late 1950‟s, the ACT would become formidable
(perhaps necessary) competition for the SAT in the testing industry.17
Furthermore, it is essential albeit difficult to set parameters for the concept of legitimacy.
For the sake of this thesis, legitimacy shall be discussed in educational and legal terms. A
definition pertinent to this study will be forged from other scholars‟ standards for educational
and legal legitimacy. Stephen J. Thornton provides the most straightforward definition of
educational legitimacy. He argues that subjects and concepts gain legitimacy when “they [come]
to be broadly considered and accepted in American education.”18 Yet, Thornton also posits that it
is the content of a subject, rather than the methods and theory used within a field, that tends to

16

Gene I. Maeroff, ―2 Coaching Concerns Barred From Using S.A.T. Materials,‖ New York Times, August
2, 1985: A1, B4, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007),
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/111181556?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 14, 2011).
17

Rebecca Zwick, Fair Game?: The Use of Standardized Admissions Tests in Higher Education. (New
York: Routledge Farmer, 2002), 11-13; George H. Hanford, Life With the SAT: Assessing Our Young People and
Our Times (New York: College Entrance Examination Board: 1991), 15-21.
18

Stephen J. Thornton, ―Legitimacy in the Social Sciences Curriculum,‖ in Education Across A Century,
the Centennial Volume: One Hundredth Yearbook of the National Society of the Study of Education, vol 1., ed. Lyn
Corno (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 185.

9

grant a subject public legitimacy. A similarly clear definition of educational legitimacy is found
in Lawrence Levine‟s study of canons in American academia. Levine posits that educational
trends gain legitimacy when put into action: “teaching subjects in schools and colleges gives
them cultural legitimacy”; the volatility of the educational canon, however, tends to be ignored. 19
Meanwhile, legal scholar Richard Fallon discusses the legitimacy of the United States
Constitution by first arguing that the notion of legitimacy is itself multifaceted. He asserts that
“legitimacy invites appeal to three distinct kinds of criteria that in turn support three concepts of
legitimacy: legal, sociological, and moral.”20 In this sense, legitimacy is itself reflexive. When
one challenges the constitutionality of an action or statute, one is really alleging that the
unconstitutional item is illegal, socially aberrant, or immoral. In turn, the spectra of legality,
social acquiescence, and morality individually define legitimacy, and so an action or statute may
be of mixed and variant legitimacies.
This essay addresses legitimacy along several lines in order to fulfill its purpose. It must
consider whether the test-prep industry gained public legitimacy primarily through the material
covered in test-prep courses (i.e., question types, math review, grammar review, and vocabulary
practice), or instead through the strategies and techniques developed for effective standardized
test-taking. Did test-prep gain legitimacy in a fashion akin to subjects and fields in the American
educational canon? In turn, the thesis must consider if the volatility of test-prep‟s methods and
media were ignored once it became a legitimized educational practice. As the test-prep industry
19

Lawrence W. Levine, The Opening of the American Mind: Canons, Culture, and History (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1996), 98. The author maintains that the denial of the educational canon‘s flux was particularly
evident among academic figureheads during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who initially disagreed
with widespread shifts in higher education.
20

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., ―Legitimacy and the Constitution,‖ Harvard Law Review 118, no. 6 (April 2005):
1790, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093285 (accessed May 5, 2010).
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and the entire for-profit education sector has been involved in several federal court cases, this
essay should determine if the judicial opinions and verdicts from those cases illustrate a
multifaceted scheme of legitimacy.
Fourthly, the terms “youth,” “adolescence,” and “teenage” should be clarified,
particularly when they are placed within the frames of business and enterprise. As Joseph Kett
illustrates in his monograph Rites of Passage, most pre-industrial Western societies had a rather
broad perception of youth. Once children no longer needed constant maternal supervision, they
entered a broad patch of life that Kett deems “semidependance,” in which individuals provided
monetary succor through labor in order to lessen their familial economic burden.21 In turn, the
duration of a youth‟s education was considerably longer than that of contemporary standards, but
seasonal work obligations often forced youth to routinely forgo their studies for several-month
stretches, or to cease their education after the most rudimentary levels. An individual, or more
appropriately, a male was generally considered an adult once he became a full member of his
vocational community, often leading to a hazy border between youth and adulthood during the
early American republic.22 Hence, Kett‟s research shows that American society has defined lifestages, and in turn education, in economic terms since the nation‟s earlier eras.
The concept of adolescence emerged with industrialization, and has moved beyond G.
Stanley Hall‟s claim that the life stage is “a new birth […] suggestive of some ancient period of
storm and stress.”23 With this, adolescence is regarded as a natural process because it is merged
21
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with pubescence. Kett maintains that Hall and other key early advocates for psychological
approaches to youth tended to meld their notions of adolescence with their “positivistic
preference[s] for studying religious affections.”24 That is, Hall spoke of adolescents as though he
were speaking of those who found God through redemption. Kett‟s suspicions are affirmed by
Kent Baxter, who maintains that adolescence was an element of discourse invented in order to
provide a moral bridge “by which [children] could become adults.”25 If Nancy Lesko is to be
believed, pervasive Western conceptions of adolescence have societal credence because
adolescence is portrayed as a scientific—and thus, natural—phenomenon. (Conversely, those
societies and cultures which lack an analogous construct of adolescence are seen as unnatural,
backwards, or perverse.)26
Meanwhile, the concept of “teenage” adds another dimension to social construction. As
Sarah Chinn quips in her study of fin de siècle immigrant adolescents, “[a]dolescent stroppiness
has always been, after all, inextricable from the marketplace.”27 Adolescents have been socially
and historically imbued with insouciance, caprice, and melodrama; teenagers have been socially
and historically defined as adolescents who exhibit such emotions through consumption.
Although Jon Savage and Grace Palladino disagree over the evolution of the concept of teenage,
both authors concur that teenage is inseparable from capitalism; Savage notes the term
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crystallized by the end of the Second World War to define “the adolescent consumer.”28 The
economic nature for concepts of youth in American society means that businesses and industries
may have the ability to alter such concepts over time.
Finally, this essay needs a brief remark about the study of intelligence. As Anna Ciaciolo
and Robert Sternberg explain, intelligence is historically discussed through “metaphors to help
[…] conceptualize intelligent metaphor.”29 The authors maintain that psychologists have
discussed intelligence through seven broad tropes since the 1800s; intelligence has been related
in “geographic, computational, biological, epistemological, sociological, anthropological, and
system[ic]” terms.30 Spurred by the anthropological interpretation of intelligence, Paul Michael
Privateer maintains intelligence, as applied in any arena, is simply a Eurocentric power
mechanism. As intelligence has so thoroughly “shap[ed] social epistemologies and hierarchies of
power,” its arbiters are able to remain in the dominant position of a social power dynamic
without this imbalance seeming perverse; the dominant perception of intelligence is applied
through science so as to seem natural.31 This literature on intelligence and intelligence testing
indicates that there is a disconnect between what facets of intelligence are innate, what facets are
nurtured, how these facets operate, and to what broader societal purpose the awareness of

28

Jon Savage, Teenage: The Prehistory of Youth Culture, 1875-1945 (London: Penguin, 2007), 465. See
also: Grace Palladino, Teenagers: An American History (New York: Basic Books, 1996), xi-116.
29

Anna T. Cianciolo and Robert J. Sternberg, Intelligence: A Brief History (Oxford and Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 1.
30

Ibid.

31

Paul Michael Privateer, Inventing Intelligence: A Social History of Smart (Oxford and Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 2. See also: John White, Intelligence, Destiny, and Education: The Ideological Roots
of Intelligence Testing (New York: Routledge, 2006).

13

intelligence serves.32 Such discrepancies may be what truly draw the history of the test-prep
industry into the mainstream history of American education.

Scoping the Literature
The historical research devoted to the test-prep industry is rather scant, and
predominately subsumed within scholarship focused on the SAT, which is ironically a topic with
a seemingly limitless scope of literature. However, there is enough research pertaining to the
test-prep industry that one can say that there is a literature that exhibits several general trends.
Research and scholarship on the test-prep industry can be broken into two broad (but clearly
discernable) camps: scholarship on American standardized testing during the twentieth century
that considers the test-prep industry intermittently throughout a broader narrative; and scientific
studies which seek to gauge the level of improvement in students‟ performances on standardized
tests after receiving some form of test-prep.
The first camp, in which the test-prep industry is discussed in relation to the bigger story
of the SAT and standardized testing in general, is best characterized by the work of three
authors: Nicholas Lemann, Rebecca Zwick, and Allan Nairn. Lemann‟s seminal text The Big
Test frames the SAT as the byproduct of an Episcopalianism-influenced push by certain
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academics “to reform—literally re-form” the way that the American educational system fostered
an elite class following the Second World War.33 Lemann argues that the meritocratic ideal
established by those individuals responsible for the promulgation of the SAT and other
standardized exams was an ersatz form of egalitarianism. Rather, these exams were designed to
create a new American elite through psychometric principles.
Lemann‟s depiction of the test-prep industry is overall favorable, particularly for Stanley
Kaplan. The author stresses that Kaplan‟s appreciation for the opportunities provided by
standardized testing, as well as his own educational credentials, were lost on the College Board
and ETS. Neither institution accepted the notion that somebody who admired the SAT or any
other standardized test would dare devise techniques from which students could improve their
score. Lemann argues that “the passage of [New York State‟s] truth-in testing law” in the late
1970s was the key broker for the test-prep industry‟s sense of legitimacy.34 Although this essay
argues that other factors played equally crucial roles in establishing a broader acceptance for testprep, it will not neglect the evident role of truth-in-testing legislation in this process.
Rebecca Zwick, while taking a more reserved tenor than Lemann, does not refrain from
criticizing the American standardized testing apparatus. However, in her text Fair Game?, the
author also maintains that previous analyses and polemics against test manufacturers “[were]
based on fuzzy and incomplete notions.” 35 That is, the dissatisfaction certain Americans find
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with the standardized testing system stems from a widespread ignorance of its basic
infrastructure and agenda. Zwick devotes a chapter of this text to the widespread, complicated,
and mis-analyzed test-prep industry. However, Zwick is less receptive toward the industry than
Lemann as she places coaching on the same spectrum as cheating.36 While Zwick does refer to
instances of test-coaching (and cheating) on British and Chinese entrance exams prior to the
twentieth century, she neglects the American test-prep industry prior to the mid-1970s.37 In turn,
Zwick argues that the Federal Trade Commission‟s investigation of the test-prep industry did not
provide test-coaching the legitimacy it had sought. This thesis shall argue to the contrary.
Nonetheless, Zwick does stress “that the duration, focus, and quality of coaching” makes any
study of the industry an inherently difficult endeavor.38 Hence, this essay shall attempt to
embrace the multifaceted nature of the industry while also biasing its attention toward nationallyknown companies for the sake of narrative continuity and intra-industrial comparison.
Perhaps the most well-known polemic against Educational Testing Service and
standardized testing in general is Allan Nairn‟s The Reign of ETS. Mentored by Ralph Nader,
Nairn spares no vitriol for the nonprofit agency, and smears the test-prep industry in the process.
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The author regards coaching schools as “a respectable form of cheating.”39 Test-prep
entrepreneur Robert Scheller is quoted as having taken advantage of ETS‟s registration policies
in order to sit for the SAT and memorize examination questions; customers benefitted from the
disreputable actions of others without feeling that they themselves have crossed ethical bounds.
To Nairn, whose research helped fuel the push for truth-in-testing legislation, coaching schools
profited from selling the bounty of their outright theft at a premium price, thereby reinforcing the
relationship between a student‟s SAT scores and his or her family‟s income.40
In this sense, Nairn‟s consideration of the test-prep industry is used as documentary
evidence that unethical or, at least, unsavory practices stemmed from ETS and the broader
standardized testing apparatus. This argument continues in far more recent works, albeit
increasingly divorced from Nairn‟s original indictments against standardized testing. Written in
2010, Michael Riccards‟s slim narrative on the history of the College Board devotes a single
paragraph to the test-prep industry, which is dismissed as an institution of the well-to-do that
profited from selling “skills or „tricks‟” for mastering any standardized test.41 However, Riccards
keenly refers to test-prep as a “cottage industry,” a framework worth minding in this thesis.42
The focus of the second camp of research is not so much recalling the history of test-prep
as determining test-coaching‟s degree of usefulness on the SAT and other entrance exams. What
complicates the trends in this section of literature is the relationship between certain scientists
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and the standardized testing industry. The College Board and ETS frequently funded research on
standardized test validity and coachability. Two sources illustrate this issue wonderfully. The
first, The Effect of Coaching on Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores, contains the findings from seven
College Board-funded studies which uphold the notion that the SAT was not coachable. These
studies, which were conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s, as well as the pamphlet‟s
introductory official statement give a clear indication of test manufacturers‟ early disdain of testprep.43 The second, Abstracts from the Research and Development Report Series, 1963-1981,
contains digests for ETS studies on standardized testing in that eighteen-year period. Many of
these studies concerned the SAT, and several investigated the exam‟s level of coachability.44
Not all research on the SAT‟s degree of coachability had the College Board or ETS‟s
approval, but one must not presume that these are without their own complications. Warner
Slack and Douglas Porter‟s seminal 1980 essay for the Harvard Educational Review, in which
the authors condemn the College Board and ETS for perpetuating misperceptions of the SAT,
was itself a meta-analysis.45 That is, Slack and Porter derived their findings and criticism from
the statistically synthesized results from previous studies on SAT coaching. The discretion of
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researchers in selecting what studies go into a meta-analysis may lead to a fundamental bias in
the results of a meta-analysis.

Establishing Direction
The following discussion of the test-prep industry's acquisition of legitimacy shall be
broken into three chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter will focus on the test-prep industry
between 1946 and 1975, and how the test-prep industry slowly developed a sense of legitimacy
through advertising. In particular, this chapter will discuss the growth of Stanley H. Kaplan
Educational Centers, how its advertising was markedly different than its competition, and why
these differences may have helped the industry at-large develop greater legitimacy. Meanwhile,
the chapter will also discuss the origins and development of Educational Testing Service, and
how certain facets of this non-profit may have inadvertently fostered an educational environment
beneficial to the growth of the test-prep industry.
Chapter One‟s analysis of the style and evolution of the advertising used by Kaplan and
other contemporaneous test-prep companies will serve four key functions. First, these
advertisements will help show the relationship between Kaplan‟s public projection and the
company‟s self-perception as a “poor man‟s private school,” as well as the differences between
Kaplan‟s self-portrayal and that of its competition.46 Secondly, indicating when and where
Kaplan and its competition placed advertisements will determine the extent that direct
advertisement influenced the growth and overt presence of the industry. Thirdly, this analysis
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will show what information these ads omitted, particularly in terms of pricing and preparatory
content. Finally, these advertisements can be a useful source for deconstruction. Analyzing the
language and imagery used within these ads will show how Kaplan and its ilk engaged readers
(and potential clientele) in a rhetoric that merged the realistic and the fantastic; an SAT prep
course was portrayed not a as commodity, but rather as “dream insurance.”47
The second chapter will analyze how the test-prep industry brokered legitimacy through
several arenas during the 1960s and 1970s. The first arena was the business world, best
illustrated with the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection‟s investigation of
“test-coaching.”48 The resultant FTC report was an investigation of certain portions of the testprep industry, and whether they were abiding by legitimate business practices. The second arena,
exemplified by the Nairn Report and New York State‟s truth-in-testing legislation, was the
cultural debate over the validity of standardized aptitude tests. Both test manufacturers and the
test-prep industry garnered public distrust. Contradictory concepts of aptitude were used by testmakers and test-coachers, leading to public confusion (and dismay) over what standardized tests
measured, whether they had any relevance to collegiate success, whether coaching produced
genuine improvement in test scores, and if coaching gave undue advantage to those who could
afford test-prep.
But, this chapter will also show that the test-prep industry accrued legitimacy through
channels in which it had little if any direct involvement. Certain trends and experiments in
47
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American education at-large during the 1960s and 1970s, such as performance contracting and
school voucher programs, aided in giving the test-prep industry greater legitimacy by directly
addressing "the [demand] of education consumers" in public schooling.49 Proponents maintained
that education, while a necessity, was subject to the same market conditions as other vital goods
and services, and that the boundaries of acceptable overt interaction between business and
education ought to be expanded.50 Meanwhile, the creation of the Department of Education in
the late 1970s also allowed the test-prep industry to claim a greater sense of legitimacy. The
Carter Administration‟s push for a separate cabinet-level education department led to a relatively
neutered bureaucratic apparatus that lacked any genuine ability to proscribe educational practices
that had already been deemed acceptable and legal. The net effect of the developments in all of
these channels during the 1960s and 1970s was that the test-prep industry gained legitimacy by
default. The industry was acceptable because no party had been able to conclusively prove the
industry was wholly unacceptable.
The third chapter will discuss the expansion of the test-prep industry during the 1980s.
Following truth-in-testing legislation, the relationship between test-manufacturers and the testprep industry shifted. Both parties began to engage in pseudo-antagonism and symbiotic
adaptation. That is, test-makers and test-prep companies both behaved in ways that seemed to
threaten the operational integrity of the other side, but actually compelled both parties to adapt in
ways that, directly or indirectly, benefitted all involved in standardized testing.
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Most notably, the test-prep industry developed a broader competitive field. The
industry‟s balance of power altered dramatically after John Katzman founded The Princeton
Review (or “TPR”) in 1981. TPR gained clientele with its staunchly antipathetic view toward the
SAT and its alleged capabilities, claiming that a student‟s performance on a standardized exam
was solely indicative of their ability to perform well on such tests.51 This view, as seen in
Katzman‟s statements to the media as well as TPR‟s print advertisements, was markedly distinct
from that of TPR‟s largest competitor at the time, Kaplan.52 Hence, standardized testmanufacturers were forced to contend with additional test-prep companies that provided multiple
ways to systematically approach the test, and had differing strategies to court clientele. How else
could the College Board respond but to enter the field itself?
But, the growth of The Princeton Review also caused the relationship between
standardized test-manufacturers and the test-prep industry to take a decidedly litigious bent in the
1980s. This is illustrated by the 1986 U.S. District Court for New Jersey case (and its subsequent
appeal to the Third Circuit) ETS vs. John Katzman and The Princeton Review, Inc., in which the
nonprofit sued The Princeton Review and its president for copyright infringement.53 Meanwhile,
Kaplan‟s actions during the 1980s demonstrate that the test-prep industry also achieved a sense
51

Jonathan Rowe, ―Preparing for the SAT,‖ Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 1986: Ideas 21;

microfilm.
52

Several keen examples of The Princeton Review‘s print advertising can be seen in its display ads in The
New York Times on September 8, 1981: C5; February 12, 1985: C11; January 26, 1986: WC24; February 8, 1987:
WC29; and September 13, 1987: CN37; all accessed and available from ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New
York Times (1851-2007),
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/advanced?accountid=10003&language=En.
53

Educational Testing Service v. John Katzman and The Princeton Review, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 527, 1985
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16749; Educational Testing Service v. Katzman, et al., 1986 U.S. Dist. Lexis 28094; Educational
Testing Service v. John Katzman and The Princeton Review, 631 F. Supp. 550, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27305; and
Educational Testing Services v. John Katzman, The Princeton Review, Inc., Robert S. Sche[ll]er and PreTest
Review, Inc., 793 F. 2d 533, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 26296: 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156. The judicial opinions for all
of these cases, and almost all other court cases discussed in this thesis, were accessed through LexisNexis
Academic: http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/.

22

of legitimacy by proxy. The company, which by then had become a highly profitable nationwide
corporation, was acquired by The Washington Post Company in 1985.54 Kaplan‟s transition
from a successful, tightly-knit independent corporation to a highly-profitable subsidiary of a
media parent company may have spurred further shifts in the relationship between ETS and the
test-prep industry. The net effect of the developments within the test-prep industry during the
1980s was a sense of permanence. Too many parties, including the test-makers, had a vested
interest in the industry. No company within the industry held a business or an ideological quasimonopoly, and the forced transparency of standardized testing guaranteed that the industry could
quickly adapt to whatever changes standardized test-makers made to their exams.
The thesis will conclude with final remarks about the research, a reconsideration of how
the development of the test-prep industry relates to the current state and crises in American
education at-large, and most importantly, a discussion of possible directions for future historical
studies on the test-prep industry. Following that, the appendix contains an overview of the testprep industry during the 1990s and 2000s. Ultimately, any discussion of for-profit pursuits in
American education, whatever their manifestations, is inherently politically charged.
Conservative groups such as the Cato Institute laud proprietary endeavors as effective
alternatives to the bloated and “stagnant public school system,” and claim that these
“edupreneurs” demonstrate the government‟s ineffective and illegitimate claim to serve public
welfare.55 Meanwhile, liberal commentators look at corporate interference in educational
content, such as the secondary school science material developed by BPAmoco, as a means to
54

Phillip H. Wiggins, ―Washington Post to Buy Tutoring Centers Chain,‖ New York Times, 21 November,
1984; D5, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007),
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/122418342?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 14, 2011).
55

Carrie Lips, ―‘Edupreneurs‘: A Survey of For-Profit Education,‖ Policy Analysis no. 386 (Washington,
D.C.: Cato Institute, 2000) 14; 1.

23

“defund the public sector […as well as] redefine the public schools as sources for private
profit.”56 In a sense, the intersection of business and education becomes politicized, or rather,
becomes publicly controversial, when it becomes visible. It is easy to ignore that which we
cannot see or give a name. If anything, this essay shall be a discussion of this invisibility, and
how American society has dealt with it.
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CHAPTER ONE: STANLEY KAPLAN, EDUCATIONAL TESTING
SERVICE, AND THE ART OF ADVERTISING, 1946-1975

I‟ll never forget my introduction to the SAT. It was 1946. I was at the home of a
high school junior named Elizabeth, who lived near Coney Island, to help her
with intermediate algebra. As we sat down at her kitchen table, she said, “Mr.
Kaplan, I need to take an important test. It‟s called the SAT. Can you help me?‟
[…] I looked at the sample questions, and a broad smile stretched across my face.
It was love at first sight.
--Stanley H. Kaplan57

According to the self-styled lore found in his autobiography Test Pilot, Stanley H. Kaplan
opened an independent tutoring business in his parents‟ home in 1938 following his rejection
from medical school. Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Center later became the largest
standardized test-preparation (“test-prep”) business in the nation. As seen by the above quote, the
Scholastic Aptitude Test (“SAT”) was not the impetus of Kaplan‟s business. Founded in the
Flatbush neighborhood of Brooklyn, Kaplan originally specialized in preparation for the New
York State Regents Exam. As the proprietor noted, “scoring well on the Regents was the surest
ticket for middle-class public school kids to go to college.”58 Yet, test-prep for the SAT would
become Kaplan‟s mainstay, earning his business a reputation (or infamy) in the process.
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As the author Nicholas Lemann notes, Kaplan built a loyal customer base in his native
Brooklyn during the business‟s early years of operation, taking in clientele from the central and
southern portions of the heavily-populated borough. The entrepreneur‟s initial clientele typically
consisted of working- and middle-class Jewish high-schoolers in Brooklyn, mainly thirdgeneration Americans.59 These customers had educational experiences similar to Kaplan‟s, and
the entrepreneur saw his company as a way to help counteract the prevailing anti-Semitism in
higher education that he himself had endured in the 1930s. Being “lower-middle-class, Jewish,
[and] public-school-educated,” Kaplan saw standardized tests, and in turn test-prep, as a way to
create a fairer system of admissions in higher education.60
Due to this admiration for standardized testing, the businessman believed that the courses
offered at Stanley H. Kaplan Education Center served as a “poor man‟s private school.”61 While
the upfront cost of a Kaplan SAT prep course may have seemed steep, the alleged result of a
significantly improved performance on college entrance exams would have placed a student on
seeming parity with one who had paid far more to receive an elite private education. Educational
disparities that one could not control (e.g., household wealth and purchasing power) could be
leveled off through a prep course. College admissions would thus be more equitable.
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Soon after Kaplan‟s fateful meeting with Elizabeth, he offered his first preparatory course
for the SAT. The course, which “consisted of four-hour weekly classes lasting sixteen weeks,”
cost $128.62 When adjusted for inflation, the $128 spent on Kaplan‟s first SAT prep course in
1946 would be equivalent to spending over $1430 on the same product in 2010. 63 Moreover,
this fee for SAT coaching was for each individual student. For example, had five students
enrolled in Kaplan‟s first SAT prep course, then each student would have paid $128 for the same
sixty-four hours of instruction and instructional material. Kaplan would have thus made $640, or
ten dollars per hour, for the same sixty-four hours of teaching. The entrepreneur claimed that he
had 200 clients for SAT coaching within his first year of offering the service.64 Were all of these
clients to have been enrolled in Kaplan‟s SAT prep course, then Kaplan would have netted
$25,600 solely off of this facet of his business within its first year.
This figure—128 dollars for 64 hours of SAT-prep instruction—gains better meaning
when placed within the context of national income standards for the time. The American median
income in 1947 was $2,685, and by 1950, this figure had risen to $2,990.65 An average American
family during this four-year span would have had to contribute between 4.28% and 4.77% of its
yearly income in order to afford a Kaplan SAT prep course, had the opportunity been available
nationwide. Yet, when one segregates median income levels by race, a stark contrast emerges.
Between 1947 and 1950, white American families‟ median income grew from $3,157 to $3,445,
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but nonwhite American families‟ median income rose from $1,614 to $1,869.66 Whereas the
average white family would have only had to contribute between 3.72% and 4.05% of its income
in order to afford Kaplan‟s first SAT prep course, the average nonwhite family would have had
to contribute between 6.85% and 7.93% of its annual income to do so.
However, any discussion of the test-prep industry‟s early decades cannot focus on
Stanley Kaplan alone, nor can it discuss Kaplan or other such businesses without broader
historical context. This chapter will thus first discuss the demographics for New York City and
State during the late 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s in order to gauge the social and economic
atmosphere of the area during the early years of Kaplan‟s business. Then, the chapter will
discuss the development and first decade of Educational Testing Service (“ETS”) in order to
explain the preponderance of standardized testing during the 1950s, illustrate the company‟s
early position against test-prep, and show the fascinations shared by both ETS and test-prep
companies. Finally, this chapter will analyze the print advertising of test-prep companies from
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. This will show how, and in which publications, these businesses
courted the public, which test-prep goods were advertised, where companies tended to advertise,
what rhetorical and linguistic devices these companies used, and why certain companies such as
Kaplan found greater success in the print advertising medium.

66

United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, ―Table 8: Families and Unrelated
Individuals by Total Money Income in 1947 to 1972, by Race of Head‖ Current Population Reports, Series P-60,
no.90: Consumer Income (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1973), 32.

28

A Numbers Game
Any analysis of Kaplan‟s early entrepreneurial approaches and initial SAT course costs
would be unfair if solely based on national figures as one cannot presume the demographics for
New York State, much less New York City, were in lockstep with the rest of the nation. Instead,
it would be more prudent to explore the demographics for Brooklyn, New York City and New
York State during the 1930s and 1940s in order to better understand atmosphere of the borough
when Mr. Kaplan decided to begin his business. Following that, it would make sense to compare
Kaplan and his chosen profession against other New Yorkers working in education in 1940. This
comparison will help better determine if Kaplan was truly anomalous or part of a broader trend
in educational proprietorship.
In 1940, Kings County, which is coterminous with the Borough of Brooklyn, had
2,698,285 residents, of whom nearly 96% were white.67 Kings was the most populous county in
New York at the time, and a highly racially homogeneous one as well. (But, ironically, only four
of the state‟s sixty-one other counties were less homogeneous.) More telling are the county‟s
educational statistics. In 1940, 77.4 percent of Brooklyn‟s residents over age twenty-five had
completed “5 or more grades” of schooling.68 Although this figure was high for the decade in
relation to other areas of the nation, Kings County had the second-lowest such figure in New
York State. Only Rockland County had proportionally fewer residents who completed primarylevel education. In turn, fewer than one in five adult residents of Brooklyn had a high-school
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education. The median level of educational attainment in Kings County was 8.5 years of
schooling, a figure slightly lower than that for the other four boroughs of New York City. 69
Figures from the 1940 United States Census illustrate that Kaplan did not start his career
at the most economically opportune moment. As Kaplan was embarking upon entrepreneurship,
the rest of the United States was creaking out the Great Depression. Of New York City‟s
6,102,747 residents in 1940 above the age of 14, only 3,474,760 were counted as members of the
labor force. In turn, only 2,839,366—or roughly 81.74 percent—of those residents in the labor
force were actually employed. The figure augments to a slightly less grim 84.7 percent when one
factors in those residents employed in “public emergency work.”70 Even if one attempted to
mitigate the severity of the employment figures by focusing on those for men only, the results do
not grow substantially. Of the 2,424,740 men in New York City‟s labor force in 1940 (out of
2,989,576 men above age fourteen at the time), 1,964,346 were employed in non-emergency
circumstances, a figure barely greater than 81 percent. Such figures were indicative of a broader,
thirty-year decline in the relationship between working-age males in New York City and those in
the labor force.71
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These labor figures are not mitigated unless the level of employment for the teenaged is
taken into consideration. In 1940, there were 720,252 individuals aged fourteen to nineteen, of
whom only 207,219 (or roughly 28.8 percent) were members of the labor force. Of these
207,219 young men and women, slightly more than 79 percent were eighteen or nineteen years
of age. Conversely, of the 233,658 males between fourteen and seventeen years of age in New
York City in 1940, only 22,917 were in the labor force. Only 9,012 of these young men were
actually employed at the time. 72 Overall, the 43,281 employable minors (those between ages
fourteen and seventeen) comprised only 9.8 percent of all males and 8.7 of all females aged 1417 in the city that year.73 These figures are comparable to those for New York State in 1940.
The 76,284 employable minors in the labor force that year comprised only 10 percent of all
males and 7.5 percent of all females in this age group statewide.
Such figures indicate that Stanley Kaplan entered his tutoring business when those under
eighteen years of age were more disinclined (or discouraged) to seek employment, a supposition
which is strengthened when figures for employed minors of New York City and State in 1940 are
compared to analogous figures for previous decades. In 1930, roughly one-fifth of the state‟s
841,331 youth aged fourteen to seventeen were in the labor force. For New York City, the figure
was closer to one-quarter; 110,552 of the city‟s 456,860 employable minors were in the labor
force. The statistics for New York City in 1920 are even higher: 46 percent of all boys and 41.6
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percent of all girls aged fourteen to seventeen were in the labor force.74 Stanley Kaplan came of
age in New York City as increased emphasis was placed on secondary education, and entered
into his business as broad economic factors forced many youth to delay entry into the labor
force. Hence, Kaplan benefitted from a broader potential clientele for his tutoring business than
previously possible.
Correspondingly, Kaplan‟s business began as an increasing proportion of older
adolescents were staying in school. By 1930, an overwhelming majority of 14 and 15 year-old
youth in Kings County were remaining in school. However, the idea that 16 and 17 year-olds
would stay school did not become similarly commonplace until after 1940. (Even so, the rate of
16 and 17 year-olds attending school significantly trailed that of their slightly younger adolescent
counterparts.)75 Nonetheless, Kaplan began his tutoring business when an increased number of
older adolescents were compelled or required to complete their secondary education. This trend
continued as Kaplan began SAT test-coaching several years later.
But was Kaplan‟s decision to devise techniques for upwardly-mobile, mostly-white
Brooklyn youth with discretionary family income to master the Scholastic Aptitude Test truly
anomalous? Indeed, one can find scant evidence in New York Times advertisements from the
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1930s and 1940s of individuals soliciting their coaching services for the College Board exams.76
But none of these ads made any reference to the SAT itself, indicating that the aptitude test may
not have been seen by many as a viable exam to coach, given that aptitude was viewed as a
rather immutable facet of intelligence. Or, perhaps, the SAT was seen as a far less pressing
concern to college hopefuls in comparison to other subject-based College Board entrance exams.
But, New York City and State‟s 1940 figures for educational workers suggest that
Kaplan‟s business may have been part of a broader trend in educational entrepreneurship.
(Kaplan did receive a Master‟s degree in education in 1940, but he never worked in a traditional
school.77) According to the 1940 Census, 52,259 men and 93,190 women were employed as
teachers of some sort in New York State. Unlike subsequent censuses, the figures only make
distinctions for art teachers, college professors, and music teachers; the other 102,422 individuals
are simply listed as “Teachers, n.e.c. [not elsewhere classified].”78 Unsurprisingly, the majority
of teachers for the state, regardless of classification, resided in New York City. In 1940, the city
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was home to 47,232 teachers without specific classification, 16,991 of whom residing in
Brooklyn. More “n.e.c” teachers lived in Brooklyn than in any of the other four boroughs.79
Although the specification “n.e.c.” could merely refer to those working in a school
system, i.e., primary and secondary school teachers, certain census figures for these teachers
indicate that the classification may have been broader, thus including entrepreneurs such as
Stanley Kaplan. The enumerated “n.e.c.” teachers in New York City in 1940 include instances of
precocity, with two hundred sixty-six “n.e.c.” teachers were nineteen years of age or younger.80
More telling are the income distribution levels for “n.e.c.” teachers in New York State. The
broadest swath of teachers reported incomes for 1940 between $1,600 and $4,999 dollars, a
range with as equivalent purchasing power as $24,934.63 to $77,905.13 in 2010 terms.81
However, among all “n.e.c.” teachers in New York State, fully 19,528 reported incomes of less
than $600; this would be equivalent to reporting an income of less than $9,350.49 in 2010.
Finally, the classification of education jobs in New York City by type was broad enough
to merit Kaplan and his contemporaries‟ inclusion. The 1940 census lists 73,839 individuals in
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New York City as working in “educational services.”82 Within this group, 50,110 are classified
as “professional and semi-professional workers”; 608 as “proprietors, managers, and officials”;
and 5,906 as “clerical, sales, and kindred workers.”83 While it would be foolish not to infer that a
great deal of these professional categories do not fit within the public and private education
apparatuses (e.g., principals and superintendants as “officials,” or secretaries and
paraprofessionals as “clerical” workers), it would also be hasty to ignore the possibility that
some of those who provided “educational services” did not necessarily work in primary or
secondary education. The evidence suggests that while Kaplan may have been an unusually
early proponent of test-prep for the SAT, he was not the only person who found profit in
education outside of the schoolhouse.

The Transition From the College Board to Educational Testing Service
As Stanley Kaplan‟s SAT-coaching was becoming a popular option for students
throughout Kings County and the New York City metropolitan area, the SAT was gaining
additional custodial oversight. The history of the SAT as well as the transition of its development
from the College Entrance Examination Board (or “College Board”) to Educational Testing
Service (or “ETS”) in the late 1940‟s have been well-documented elsewhere, particularly by
those in the standardized testing industry.84 Following World War Two, certain extra-
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governmental bodies felt that standardized testing no longer proved adequate in its current state.
A 1946 investigative committee funded by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching, and headed by Harvard President J. B. Conant, determined that none of the extant
organizations that developed and administered educational tests “[were] strong enough or wellto-do enough to support the development of testing as it should be developed.”85
The committee‟s recommendation was simple: merge. The new organization spawned
from this merger, Educational Testing Service, would become the primary source for test
research and development in American education and government. The agencies that did
combine, most notably the College Board, were to retain figurehead statuses. Hence, Henry
Chauncey and William Turnbull, who were appointed the top positions at ETS upon its
inception, also maintained their respective executive positions at the College Board. Confusion
arose over how these dual duties, which came without commensurate salaries, would be
accorded full and proper attention. These men simplified the matter by resigning from their
positions at the College Board in early 1948.
Fortunately, the thoughts of Henry Chauncey and other Education Testing Service
officials are documented in ETS‟s Annual Report(s) to the Board of Trustees. Chauncey
indicated in the first Annual Report that the initial research conducted by ETS would have three
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foci: developing a broader catalog of aptitude tests; creating “measures of important aspects of
personality”; and manufacturing tests which could easily make “observations of behavior.”86
ETS did not exceed the ethical and operational boundaries its parent companies had set as it
simply had the financial and infrastructural means to carry out precedent ambitions. If the SAT
was initially regarded as a “psychological or intelligence test,” and if the first executives of ETS
were originally from the College Board, then one may reason that subsequent versions of the
SAT retained the original aims and intentions for the exam.87
Certain facets of the SAT, its initial years of oversight and development under ETS, and
ETS itself ought to be discussed more thoroughly in order to illustrate how they fostered an
environment conducive for the growth of the test-prep industry. One such facet is the structure of
the SAT after the College Board ceded to ETS the task of developing the exam. Compared to its
initial two decades of existence, the Scholastic Aptitude Test had a far more stable format during
its first two decades under Educational Testing Service‟s guardianship. Between 1948 and 1951,
every version of the exam consisted of the same question types: antonym questions with six
answer choices (reduced to five in 1952); analogy questions in which one must select the second
pair of words; reading comprehension questions based off of passages; sentence completion
86
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questions; and mathematical word problems with five answer choices. Save the addition of data
sufficiency questions to the mathematical section in 1959, this combination of question types
remained unchanged until 1969.88
Within this time period, however, the Scholastic Aptitude Test was, in the parlance of
ETS, accorded reduced speededness. That is, students had relatively more time to spend per
question. Just prior to ETS‟s acquisition of SAT development, a student was accorded an average
of thirty-five seconds per verbal question, and sixty seconds per mathematics question. By the
end of the 1960s, these figures rose to fifty and seventy-five seconds per question, respectively.89
Students were not necessarily granted more time. Sixty fewer questions were asked on the 1969
SAT than on the 1947 SAT, with only a ten minute reduction in overall exam duration.
Nonetheless, the test‟s reduced speededness, consistent question formats, and stable scoring scale
would provide favorable conditions for SAT-coaching. Aware that the format of the exam was
not wildly volatile from year to year, test-prep entrepreneurs had an easier time developing
preparatory material from the scant fragments of information ETS willingly divulged to the
general public.
That said, one should also consider when and how Educational Testing Service had
discussed test-prep in its early years of operation, particularly in regards to the SAT. The validity
of intelligence and aptitude testing was called into question during the early 1950‟s when the
English “Eleven-Plus” secondary school placement exams had been demonstrated to be highly
88
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vulnerable to coaching.90 In this sense, ETS was not immune from self-scrutiny. By its third year
of operation, ETS had already expressed an interest in figuring out the Scholastic Aptitude Test‟s
degree of coachability. The 1950-51 Annual Report notes that “Dr. Henry S. Dyer of Harvard”
had begun working in collaboration with ETS in order to determine the SAT‟s susceptibility to
focused instruction.91 The report stresses that such a study had the aim of protecting the
“„consumers‟ of the tests.”92
Rather than consider the possible inherent flaws of aptitude testing, Chauncey remarked
that “it [would be] manifestly undesirable to permit any applicant to gain an unwarranted
advantage over others.”93 Hence, an aptitude test and its manufacturers were above reproach,
while those who trained and were trained for better performances such tests were always
culpable. More importantly, this statement indicates Chauncey‟s refusal to accept gains made in
aptitude tests through coaching as genuine displays of aptitude. That is, there were no skills that
one could accumulate through coaching that would be seen as verbal or quantitative aptitude.
With this, Chauncey distinguished between teaching and coaching without truly defining either.
Given ETS‟ implied defense of its test-development practices and the SAT‟s structural
integrity, one ought to also consider the importance of the SAT to ETS relative to other
examinations created and administered by the agency. While the SAT retained its popularity
after ETS took over the test‟s construction, it was not the preponderant component of the
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nonprofit‟s initial operations. Between 1 January, 1948, and 30 June, 1949, 145,563 candidates
sat for 303,064 College Board achievement and aptitude tests.94 However, the SAT candidates
during ETS‟s first eighteen months of operations accounted for only 19 percent of all ETS
examination candidates, and slightly more than 16 percent of all examinations scored.
The remaining candidates tested by ETS were not all collegiate hopefuls, nor were they
all aiming for admission into graduate or professional school. ETS also used its psychometric
know-how to develop series of exams for the United States Federal Government. The nonprofit‟s
Annual Report for the 1949-50 fiscal year notes that ETS developed entrance exams for the
United States Naval, Military, and Coast Guard Academies, as well as material for those seeking
to enter foreign service.95 Two fiscal years later, the company developed selection tests for the
Naval Reserve Officer Training Program and the United States Merchant Marine Cadet Corps;
ETS also developed a “Mechanical Aptitude and Tool Relationships Test” for the Navy.96
Perhaps most important was ETS‟s development of the Selective Service College Qualification
Test during the 1950-1951 fiscal year. Chauncey remarked that this draft-deferment examination
helped fulfill the “crucial need for optimal manpower utilization.”97 The American government
needed ETS to fill roles in the sphere of defense, just as ETS needed the American government
to give the company a sense of legitimacy.
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This codependence between the American federal government and Educational Testing
Service, and ETS‟s clout and rapid growth in its early years of operation, may have stemmed
from an initial lack of federal bureaucratic oversight. Prior to 1953, the United States Federal
Government lacked a Cabinet-level officer who dealt with education. Although the government
had a Commissioner of Education under the Federal Security Agency, this position lacked the
guarantee of sustained direct contact with the president. This lack of executive oversight changed
when President Eisenhower used the Reorganization Act of 1949 in order to create the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in early 1953.98 Eisenhower‟s rationale
for the creation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare indicates that the president
sought a slimmer, more thrift-minded executive bureaucracy.99 Hence, any business or
organization that could provide services particular to one of the three components of HEW may
have been regarded favorably. However, the gap in time between the creation of ETS and the
establishment of HEW may have allowed the nonprofit agency greater leeway in its overarching
endeavors once bureaucratic infrastructure was finally created several years later.
Thirdly, one must consider how ETS interacted with the business world during its early
years, and how standardized tests factored into this interaction. From its inception, ETS sought to
integrate corporate philanthropy with educational assessment. One early example was the
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aborted Pepsi-Cola Scholarship program. Although “lack of funds” cut this program short, the
Pepsi-Cola Scholarship Program sought to provide 120 students with “four-year scholarships
covering nearly all of their college expenses,” an unprecedented level of direct corporate
educational philanthropy.100 Novelty aside, the failed endeavor set the precedent for corporations
cooperating with ETS in order to create scholarship programs. During the 1950-51 fiscal year,
ETS secured a partnership with Ford Motor Company. Ford used SAT scores as part of its
process in selecting seventy children of Ford employees to receive full college scholarships.101
More salient was the implication of such massive programs: business shall reward you for your
natural talents. In turn, these early programs, which would lead to the National Merit Scholarship
Program, allowed space for business to openly and acceptably interact with education through
standardized testing.
Finally, both ETS and certain elements of the test-prep industry shared a fascination for
emerging media and their pedagogical potential. Beginning with the 1951-1952 Annual Report,
Chauncey began a several-year campaign to revolutionize elementary and secondary education
(particularly science, English, and mathematics) through novel media. He opined:
(…) it is very doubtful that even the most capable elementary teacher can do as
uniformly good a job—from day to day and from one subject-matter area to
another—as can be done by a series of expertly-prepared instructional films.102
Bound to this sentiment was Chauncey‟s fascination with the emerging medium of
television. In the 1952-53 Annual Report, Chauncey explains that educational television
programs could become a vital asset in primary and secondary schooling, but that the new
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technology required the support of scientists and other specialists who would be willing to
produce series of educational programming. Chauncey justified his opinions by equating the
potential benefits of educational television to those already seen with educational film. The
executive remarked that “suitable instructional films are more effective than poor instructors and
at least as effective as the average instructor,” and television, if harnessed properly, should be no
different.103 In subsequent years, Chauncey would marvel over the use of closed-circuit and
open-circuit educational television programs being conducted in cities and school systems across
the country. With television, a teacher would not become redundant, but rather somehow serve
as a “constructing architect.”104 The ineffable quintessence of teaching could be better used to
guide much larger students to success along standardized lines.
Just as ETS took a liking to the latest in technology, Stanley Kaplan consistently
incorporated new technology and media into his test-preparation programs in order to increase
students‟ performances on standardized exams. Kaplan‟s “long-term relationship with the tape
recorder,” began in the late 1940s, when he began to record sessions with clients on a Sound
Mirror tape recorder.105 Students could then come back to Kaplan‟s office prior to their next
session in order to review material already covered. Kaplan would segue his early adoption of
tape recording to create a series of taped material called “Test-N-Tapes,” and these “topical
review tapes” would become a mainstay of his company.106 By offering students an array of
taped review and auxiliary material, the company presented the image of customization for its
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clientele. While clients only had a certain number of Test-N-Tapes at their disposal, the sheer
quantity was great enough to compel students to focus more strategically on particular concepts
and topics, hence giving customers the feeling that their test-prep was equally comprehensive
and suited to their needs.

Scoping the Competition
However useful Kaplan‟s series of tapes may have been or seemed for its clients, the
study aid in itself does not explain how the company attracted its customers. In general, the novel
methods and media used by test-prep companies to coach their clientele do not inherently explain
how these companies sparked consumer interest nor how they portrayed their services as
legitimate and beneficial. In order to understand how early test-prep companies cultivated
consumer bases, fashioned self-images, and portrayed their products, it is necessary to analyze
these companies‟ print advertisements from the mid-twentieth century.
Doing so first requires a little grounding in advertising theory, particularly the works of
Judith Williamson and Roland Barthes. Williamson contends that advertising is a form of
communication, unbridled from any particular medium, that “sells us the idea that we are „free‟
to „choose‟ between things.”107 That is, advertising allows its audience to believe that
consumption is a matter of genuine personal desire—and that these purchases are a genuine
reflection of social standing. Further, by “transforming the language of objects to that of people,
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and vice versa,” advertising gives consumers the ability to connect who they are (and will be)
with what they purchase.108
Meanwhile, the theorist Roland Barthes considers advertisements through a linguistic
frame. In the essay “Rhetoric of the Image,” Barthes deconstructs a French pasta print
advertisement in order to contend that these commercial “images […] produce true systems of
signs and not merely simple agglutinations of symbols.”109 That is, the imagery found in
advertisements does not directly relate to reality, but creates an evocative self-contained
depiction of reality. This imagery is parallel to what is real, but also remains within its own selfcontained world. One is addressed as a reader and as a consumer as an ad speaks to both one‟s
senses and one‟s wishes.110 However, if advertisements address individuals‟ multiple senses of
self, then the actual message of an advertisement may go beyond the simple plea to buy a certain
product. Indeed, Barthes asserts that advertisements convey to the reader “three messages: a
linguistic message, a coded iconic message, and a non-coded iconic message.”111
In this sense, advertisements for test-prep companies tapped into Barthes‟s notion of
multiple coding and Williamson‟s belief in the illusion of choice. Further, test-prep companies
shared a common coded language in their advertising. Herein lies the leap: Within these ads, the
phrases “SAT,” “Scholastic Aptitude Test,” and “College Boards” were used as connotative
images rather than just terms for the exam for which the company offered preparatory services.
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That is, references to the SAT in test-prep companies‟ ads were partially disassociated from the
actual process of taking the SAT in order to create the allure of test-prep. By viewing these
phrases and other imagery in test-prep companies‟ ads, student-consumers and their parents were
not forced to face the stark reality of college-entrance aptitude tests, but rather were drawn into
the fantasy of life with a college degree.
Given the chapter‟s opening, one might presume that Stanley H. Kaplan Educational
Centers would be the most reasonable company with which to begin an analysis of test-prep
adverts. However, there is one considerable caveat, as the company eschewed direct advertising
until the late 1960s. Stanley Kaplan found print advertising distasteful, and claimed that most of
his company‟s early business was gained through word-of-mouth notoriety. The decision to
advertise after three decades of entrepreneurship was largely reactionary:
Other professionals such as doctors and lawyers were now advertising. And my
competitors, while still smaller than Kaplan, were now advertising. […] Every
Sunday we placed an ad in the education section of The New York Times because
it gave us credibility in the serious academic world.112
So, if other test-prep companies in New York City were advertising years before Kaplan, then it
would be sensible to first discuss those competitors‟ print advertisements, in particular those
placed in the New York Times during the 1950s and 1960s. Doing so will establish precedence
for test-prep advertising, as well as clarify what may have made Kaplan‟s advertising distinct
from its competition.
Perhaps the most notorious test-prep instructors, and Kaplan‟s biggest direct competition,
in New York City during the 1950s and 1960s were Samuel C. Brownstein and Mitchel Weiner.
Stanley Kaplan had become acquainted with the pair through his work as an editor for Manny
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Barron, namesake of the Barron‟s publishing company. Weiner and Brownstein had collaborated
to write the landmark test-prep guide Barron’s How to Prepare for College Entrance
Examinations.113 The duo offered SAT-prep classes through the business College Entrance
Tutoring Service. This company‟s ads routinely appeared in the Times‟ education section in the
late 1950s and early 1960s, and never failed to tout Brownstein and Wiener‟s writing credentials.
Although the business was located at 1813 East 26th Street in south-central Brooklyn,
Brownstein and Weiner routinely held weekend morning classes “at the Statler Hilton” Hotel in
Manhattan.114 Classes were also held on weekday nights in the boroughs of Queens and
Brooklyn. These 30-hour courses were originally advertised for the price of fifty dollars, but by
1964, the fee had risen to sixty dollars.
When adjusted for inflation, the $60 price for the Brownstein-Weiner prep course would
be equivalent to roughly $420 in 2010.115 Less anachronistically, the price was less than one
percent of the median income of $6,569 for American families in 1964, and about four-fifths of
one percent of the $7230 median income that year for families in the Northeast.116 On the
surface, such relative affordability was reflective of the “substantial increase in real purchasing
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power” for Americans between 1947 and 1964.117 Incomes during this period consistently
outpaced the rate of inflation.
But, stark disparities emerge when accounting for race and education. Although the
median nonwhite family income jumped 11 percent between 1963 and 1964, this figure—
$3839—was only 56 percent of the median white income for that year.118 The BrownsteinWeiner course would have thus been one-and one-half percent of the median American nonwhite
family income. Conversely, families “headed by college graduates” had a median income of
$10,600 in 1964, thus earning on average 47 percent more than those families headed by high
school graduates, and double of those families led by workers without high school diplomas.119
By printing the price of its test-prep course, College Entrance Tutoring Service knowingly
advertised to an audience for whom $60 would have been a relatively trivial fee, and for whom
Brownstein and Weiner‟s book would have been regarded as an inferior alternative.
Certain preparatory schools also placed advertisements in the New York Times’ Education
section. These schools, such as Sadie Brown‟s Collegiate Institute, offered general education
courses with credits one could assumedly apply to certain other colleges in the metropolitan area.
As seen in an ad from 1 June, 1969, Sadie Brown‟s Collegiate Institute also provided the
“educational extra[ of p]reparation for the Scholastic Aptitude Test.”120 An advertisement
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specifically geared for Sadie Brown‟s Collegiate Institute SAT prep class was printed in the
Times nearly six months later. While the ad omits pricing information, it insists that the course,
which was scheduled to meet for ten Saturday mornings from January to March, 1970, would be
taught by “outstanding instructors [using] new teaching techniques.”121
Meanwhile, the Gilbert School, a day school located at 341 Bridge Street in northeast
Brooklyn, also courted students through the promise of SAT prep in its Times advertisement. The
school‟s ad asserted that “Preparation for [the] College Entrance Board Examination is Part of
[Gilbert‟s] High School Program”; a rigorous curriculum alone could no longer be seen as the
guarantor of a strong SAT score.122 Similarly, the Rhodes School of 11 West 54th Street,
Manhattan, frequently advertised its SAT-prep courses, while nearly-identical courses were
offered by The Highland School of Jamaica Estates, Queens. For fifty dollars, a student was able
to attend ten Saturday morning classes at either school; each course used “model tests [and] oral
drills.”123
While the vast majority of test-prep company‟s ads used unmemorable imagery, some
used provocative ad copy, most notably the advertisements for College Skills Center of 1234
Broadway, Manhattan. The company offered courses not only in the city proper, but also in
Great Neck and White Plains, two New York inner suburbs. Under the direction of Jack
Yourman and Allan Sack, the proprietary school had a ten-week course in “basic study [and]
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007),
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reading skills.”124 The preparatory services offered were not directly related to the actual material
on the examination. The copy from a Times ad for the company stressed how crucial such
preparation is:
The crucial Scholastic Aptitude Test is not a test of achievement. […] It is a test
of ability to reason from facts given. It is a thinking-power test, against time. […]
But how prepare? [sic] Cramming won‟t help; coaching with pat answers won‟t.
WHAT WILL HELP IS SCIENTIFIC TRAINING IN READING AND STUDY
SKILLS […]125
In turn, bookstores also used provocative copy in their advertisements when selling testprep material. Aldine Book Shop of White Plains, New York, purchased ad space in the Times in
order to promote its collection of Barron‟s preparatory guides. Before listing the store‟s holdings,
which included Brownstein and Weiner‟s College Boards prep guides, the ad copy attempted to
goad those students who may have held disdain toward standardized testing. The copy posited,
“Ever wonder why some students, even poorer ones, manage to get the breaks?”126 By
acknowledging that college entrance exams may not truly measure a student‟s actual capabilities,
the ad was better able to sell the Barron‟s line of test guides. For less than four dollars (with
twenty cents for shipping), a student could purchase such titles as Barron’s How to Prepare for
the PSAT, How to Prepare for College Entrance Examinations, Barron’s Vocabulary Builder,
and You Can Win a Scholarship. In turn, the student-consumer was left feeling that these books,
“concisely written by men who have spent their lives counseling and teaching,” would truly fix
the injustice of standardized tests.127
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Barron‟s itself also used provocative language to push its own line of publications. The
hook for one of Barron‟s New York Times ads asked, “Can an average high-school senior find
happiness as a college freshman?”128 The inferred answer is simple: Yes, so long as said senior
mailed several dollars to Barron‟s book repository in Woodbury, Long Island, in exchange for
several prep books. Other publishing houses relied on bravado rather than provocation. Arco
Publishing Company, headquartered at 480 Lexington Avenue, Manhattan, asserted in one ad for
the Times that its “pre-eminence in Civil Service and Educational Preparation Books [had] never
been seriously challenged.”129 For less than a dollar, a student could purchase Arco‟s Practice
for Scholastic Aptitude Tests and use the 2000 questions within the prep-book alleged to improve
one‟s performance on the exam.
This element of frugality went beyond those test-prep advertisements just shilling books.
One 1966 Times ad pushed Key Facts, a series of prepackaged flashcards for SAT preparation.
For seventy-five cents (eighty-five if ordered by mail from Dell Distributing, Inc.), a student
could “test himself […using] actual questions from past exams.”130 How these past math and
verbal SAT questions were acquired was not specified. Some proprietary prep schools offered
lecture series on SAT prep for lower prices than their SAT prep courses. For only twenty-five
dollars, both of a child‟s parents would receive admission to Student Skills Center‟s “College
Clinic,” where they would listen to a guest speaker from the College Board.131 Customers had
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their choice of attending the series at either Topsy‟s Restaurant in Forest Hills, Queens, or
Cooky‟s Restaurant in Hempstead, Long Island.
Those who had a bit more money to devote to test prep, but also held reservations toward
attending lecture series in a restaurant, still had an option with the Honor Scholastic
Development Course. For $39.95 (comparable to spending $285 in 2010), parents could
purchase an Honor Push-Button Teaching Machine for their college hopeful. Using “the latest
educational method[…of] programmed instruction,” the device used a series of scrolls designed
to provide SAT prep through self-paced study.132 By merely pushing buttons, a student could
allegedly improve his study skills as well as augment his verbal and mathematical capabilities.
The above pages were not designed to be a catalogue of tedium, but rather an illustration
of those proprietary schools and other test-prep business that advertised in the New York Times
prior to Kaplan. The advertisements not only demonstrate that the test-prep market had become a
multifaceted and highly competitive arena by the late sixties, but also illustrate the growing open
acceptance of such preparatory measures. In turn, the pricing in these advertisements shows that
the idea of SAT prep was not necessarily confined to certain socioeconomic lines. This is not to
say that those teenagers who could only afford to prepare for the exam by purchasing a book
from Barron‟s or Arco, or running to the corner store to buy a packet of Key Facts, had an
equitable opportunity to those youth who attended a Brownstein-Weiner or College Skills Center
course. However, the opportunity to prepare, as cordoned by one‟s socioeconomic status,
allowed the feeling that they were in greater control of their own destiny. For a negotiable price,
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the SAT could become a more and more familiar beast. After a peculiar start, Kaplan would
capitalize upon selling this sentiment of familiarization in its own advertising.

Selling Dream Insurance
It seems that Kaplan‟s first appearance in the New York Times’ education section had the
company aligned with the provocative style of its competitors. In a series of nineteen ads that ran
in the Times between September, 1967, and February, 1968, The National Scholastic Aptitude
Training Institute (“NSATI”) promoted its SAT prep courses. The ads indicate a degree of
collaboration between NSATI and Kaplan. The “hook,” printed in capitalized, bolded, sans-serif
font, was designed to shock readers: “82% OF ALL APPLICANTS ARE DENIED
ADMISSION TO THE COLLEGES OF THEIR INITIAL CHOICE!”133 Beneath this hook lies a
black-and-white picture of students checking in for the SAT. Below this, a guilt-laden plea:
“Since those without a college education face a limited potential, don‟t you really owe it to your
son or daughter to provide the very best preparation for the forthcoming College Board
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examinations?”134 The message was melodramatic but clear, implying that the children in the
photo, and the reader‟s own children, may be embarking upon years of disappointment should
they perform poorly on the SAT.
Upon first glance, the ads seem to show oddly little interaction between NSATI and
Kaplan. NSATI offered demonstrations and SAT prep courses in all boroughs and New York
City metropolitan areas except Brooklyn. Interested parties living in Kings County were directed
to visit Kaplan‟s office at 1675 East 16th Street. This could be mistakenly interpreted as
territorial respect, that NSATI referred interested Brooklynites to Kaplan in order to secure
market preponderance elsewhere in a clean quid-pro-quo. Yet, in the middle of the ads‟ copy, the
company reassured readers that all of its SAT coaches used the “renowned Stanley H. Kaplan
curriculum that has shown proven results for 20 years for more than 25,000 graduates.”135 While
this ad copy helps show how much influence Kaplan had in SAT prep in New York City up to
that point, it does not clear up the level of interaction and similarity between the two companies.
What further muddled the relationship between Kaplan and National Scholastic Aptitude
Training Institute was a Times ad from 25 June, 1967. The classified did not cater to students or
their parents, but rather hopeful entrepreneurs. Touting “the most exciting franchise offer in
years,” the ad solicited the opportunity to become a NSATI franchisee in a major metropolitan
area.136 A franchisee need not even be an educator in order to run an NSATI branch. Although
the advertisement did not indicate that the company (based in Hackensack, New Jersey) relied on
Kaplan‟s techniques, franchising of any sort ran counter to Kaplan‟s method of expansion during
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the late 1960s and early 1970s. Kaplan instead hired independent contractors to run his
business‟s branches “because [he] wanted complete control over the quality of the courses.”137
What arises is a kink in Kaplan‟s tale. An entrepreneur staunchly opposed to opening his own
business to franchising granted a different franchise-oriented company the right to use, at the
very least, his own reputation.
Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Center‟s first independent advertisements were far less
bombastic than those for NSATI. The first one for the New York Times appears to have been in
the 24 August, 1969, edition of the paper, at the bottom center of the Education section‟s
advertisement page. Rather than goad or shock, the ad‟s hook was a simple imperative statement:
“ENROLL NOW for SAT Preparation at the STANLEY H. KAPLAN EDUCATIONAL
CENTER.”138 Though the ad was small, its text was spare and easily grasped, and compared to
other educational ads on the page, it was nearly minimalist. The ad‟s tail, “Tutoring and
Guidance Since 1938,” attempts to instill a sense of legitimacy through longevity. Surely a
company that had business for thirty years could be trusted to provide credible services.139 The
Kaplan logo, an owl perched atop an open book, was the only image in the ad. (This insignia was
created by an agency specifically for advertisements.140) By using a logo with no overt
references to standardized tests, and instead relying on the owl and book as symbolic references
to knowledge and education, Kaplan was able to distance itself from the immediate purpose of its
business and place it within a broader context of education.
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Some of Kaplan‟s ads, such as the one placed in the Times on 24 January, 1970, were far
more ornate. Its hook, “Dream Insurance,” was typeset in all-caps black sans-serif font, and
placed over an impressionistic ink drawing of two faces peering through a lilting path toward a
majestic sunlit horizon.141 The ad copy began by asserting, “Dreams, yes…delusions, no!” Yet,
the ad also played upon ambiguity. For example, the ad stressed that SAT scores were not the
primary factor in admissions, yet then remarked that poor SAT scores would likely warrant
rejection. The ad detailed Stanley Kaplan‟s innovative instructional approach, included an
endorsement from Seventeen magazine, and even mused that students traveled cross-country to
attend a Kaplan course—but then stated that the company made “no empty promises, no absolute
guarantees.”142 To this end, the company fueled its aura of “dream insurance” by daring the
reader not to consider test-prep. If “[a] college education can help [one‟s] dreams come true,”
and college admission hinged on decent-enough SAT scores, then one would have been foolish
not to secure the only unsound link between high school and college through a Kaplan course.143
But, Kaplan did not focus all of its advertising energy toward the Times. As seen by
Kaplan‟s advertising in The Barnard Bulletin, the company also courted those who lived near the
company‟s flagship office. Barnard, a women‟s college in Manhattan, frequently ran
advertisements for Kaplan in its college newspaper during the early 1970s. Given the readership
demographics for the Bulletin, Kaplan tailored its advertisements to promote its test-prep
services for post-baccalaureate entrance exams. Some ads, such as one published in the Bulletin
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on 20 September, 1973, touted that a client‟s “[l]esson schedule [could] be tailored to meet
individual needs,” with prep courses ranging in duration from one week to one year.144 The ad
also emphasized “Special Compact Courses during Weekends,” perhaps to attract clientele who
are generally consumed with schoolwork or work during the week.145 The word “special”
designated that one was not forced to accommodate prep into their life, but rather that Kaplan
had keenly found a way to provide thorough test prep amidst a busy schedule.
Kaplan soon expanded its advertising to smaller publications in the New England and
Middle States regions, particularly in college papers. Between 1971 and 1974, Stanley H. Kaplan
Educational Center placed no fewer than forty-four advertisements in The Cornell Daily Sun.
The weekday publication was the official paper for Cornell University of Ithaca, New York, a
town that lacked an actual Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Center during this spate of advertising.
The earliest among these ads, printed between 4 February and 11 May, 1971, employed a simple,
but evocative hook: “Your Future Awaits the Test.”146 That fall, after the newspaper‟s summer
hiatus, the hook was replaced with a marquee of various standardized tests. Rather than lure a
customer in with a catchy saying, the company thought it would be more attractive to display all
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of the tests for which the company offered preparation. This is not to say that these
advertisements were mere blocks of unappealing text. Rather, the company constantly employed
insignias in each of their ads in order to convey a sense of credibility with the viewer. Every
Kaplan ad printed in the Sun during this three-year stretch ended with the motto “The Tutoring
School with the Nationwide Reputation.”147 By using the term “tutoring school,” the company
was able to distance itself from less reputable proprietary institutions and coaching schools.
The ads found in the Sun also illustrate Kaplan‟s quick rate of expansion. The company‟s
first advertisement in the paper noted that Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Center, Ltd. had
offices “in Boston[,] Philadelphia[,] Washington[, and] Detroit.”148 Seven months later, this list
grew, listing Los Angeles and Miami as locations where Kaplan operated.149 A year after that,
the ads began to state that the company held “Branches in Major Cities in [the] U.S.A.”150 In less
than two years, the company had expanded at such a rate that listing all of its major-city
locations in a small ad would have been unreasonable.
Kaplan‟s pattern of printing advertisements in cities far from its actual centers is also
illustrated in the archives of The Columbia Missourian. In a thirteen-month period between
September 1974, and October 1975, the company placed forty-six advertisements in the
Missourian. Yet, the closest city to Columbia in which Kaplan offered classes was St. Louis,
over one hundred miles to the east of Columbia. Further, the first four months of advertisements
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do not list a Missouri phone number that one could call for information. Interested readers had to
contact the center at “2050 W. Devon, [in] Chicago,” some several hours to the northeast.151
Kaplan‟s ads for the Missourian all follow the same basic template. Similar to those found in the
Cornell Daily Sun, the ads in the Missourian displayed a marquee of standardized tests and their
respective dates of administration. A thick black triangular border reminiscent of a quilted edge
framed these ads. This sentiment was heightened when extra detailing was added to the border‟s
corners beginning in January 1975. This set of advertisements attracted readers through the same
earnest but highly vague hook: “There is a difference!!!”152
Despite this evidence of Kaplan‟s growth, one would be hasty to claim that the test-prep
industry existed solely within the New York City metropolitan area until Stanley Kaplan decided
to expand his operations. As seen with the advertisements placed in the Pittsburgh publications
The Jewish Chronicle and The Jewish Criterion, the industry bloomed in other areas independent
of Kaplan‟s presence. The Pittsburgh Teachers Tutoring Service, located at 122 South Whitfield
Street, advertised in the Criterion in 1959 that it offered “group instruction [for the] college
boards.”153 In turn, Pittsburgh‟s Point Park Junior College placed advertisements in the
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Chronicle for “summer reading and study courses” geared partially toward improved
performance on the College Board exams.154
The listings continue. College Skills Center, housed within Pittsburgh‟s Clark Building,
advertised its test-prep services in the Chronicle. Students were advised to cut out and mail in a
slip in order to receive information on how College Skills Center‟s courses could help one
“[a]ttain complete readiness for [one‟s] College Boards.”155 The Pittsburgh Academy of 836
Fourth Street also implored interested readers to request information through a coupon. The
company advertised that it offered a “[c]oncentrated program in English, vocabulary, [and]
mathematics” for students preparing for the SAT.156 Meanwhile, The Laboratory School, located
within Pittsburgh‟s Maxon Towers, touted its College Boards Prep in an ad for the Chronicle;
students would improve through “technologically implemented student learning.”157 Tedium
aside, the point is clear as all of these businesses operated and advertised in Pittsburgh prior to
Kaplan, Ltd.‟s expansion into the area.
However, these advertisements do illustrate a crucial difference between Pittsburgh‟s
original test prep companies and Kaplan, Ltd. Whereas Kaplan provided standardized test
preparation geared toward the particular exam that a customer had planned on taking,
Pittsburgh‟s original test prep companies typically offered preparatory services broad enough to
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be applied to areas outside of standardized testing. Point Park Junior College‟s preparatory
course was primarily a speed-reading course, with emphasis placed on vocabulary skills and
study habits. The Laboratory School, which held a license from the Pennsylvania “State Board of
Private Academic Schools,” also focused on building students‟ skills in communication.158
Meanwhile, The Pittsburgh Academy and The Pittsburgh Teachers Tutoring Service both offered
tutoring in all subject areas, particularly for remedial instruction. Although the College Skills
Center was the most adamant among these companies in advertising its test prep services, the
company was primarily geared toward courses in general skills that would prove useful once one
entered college; it was just as wont to advertise to adolescents as to adults.
While the test prep industry began to alter its style of direct advertisement, the College
Board was itself using print media to advertise certain services to college admissions officers. As
seen with an ad found in a late 1973 issue of College Board Review, the agency sought to gain
clientele for its Student Search Service. For only “7¢ a name [and a] basic participation fee [of]
$100,” colleges that were members of the College Board could request mailing information for
high school juniors and seniors who fit certain economic, academic, or ethnic characteristics.159
For example, with an initial payment of $200, a college affiliated with the Board could
participate in Student Search Service and receive contact information for 1,428 high school
students who possessed desired criteria, and an initial $1000 could buy information on 12,857
students. Such information would be delivered “on mailing labels, on punched cards, or on
magnetic tape.”160 To reinforce the notion of encouraging the manufacture of collegiate diversity,
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the ad‟s copy contours around a sketch of a multicultural assortment of youth. The only direct
connection to academics is the sketch of a presumably-white male clutching a slide-rule in the
drawing‟s foreground. In a sense, the CEEB sought to sell “dream insurance” to its own
members; for a reasonable processing fee, and considerable faith in the SAT, any college could
use the Student Search Service to solicit and craft the ideal entering class.

Conclusion
Clearly, the operational legitimacy of the test-prep industry depends upon the presence of
standardized testing. As seen through Educational Testing Service‟s first decade of Annual
Reports, however, the presence of standardized testing was itself insufficient cause to spark the
test-prep industry‟s growth. Rather, the rapid prevalence of standardized testing, largely under
the auspices of ETS, created an environment suitable for test-prep companies to flourish. In turn,
ETS‟s foray into corporate-sponsored scholarships provided a precedent for accepted direct
interaction between higher education, business, and adolescence. Educational Testing Service‟s
fascination with new technology and emerging media was correspondent with the test-prep
industry‟s use of technology and media in its own services.
Meanwhile, the test-prep industry, particularly in New York City, benefitted from a
demographic shift. Fewer adolescents were leaving secondary school before graduating, and
fewer employable minors were active in the work force. Although the test-prep industry may
have relied more heavily on indirect and word-of-mouth advertising than on direct print
advertising, the very presence of print advertisements for test companies in the early years of the
industry provided a foundation for that industry‟s accumulation of legitimacy. Simply put, direct
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advertising took test-prep companies from clandestine operations to openly acknowledged
businesses. Kaplan, the most notable of the test prep companies, used evocative imagery and
language to distinguish itself from its competitors. Once Kaplan began to expand its operations
beyond the New York City metropolitan area, the company was quick to advertise its services.
However, some advertising decisions defy common sense unless placed in the context of
adamant rapid expansion. In turn, viewing publications from other major urban areas, notably
Pittsburgh, demonstrates that test-prep, particularly for the SAT, was not endemic to New York
City prior to Kaplan and other test-prep companies‟ expansion outside of that metropolitan area.
If Kaplan‟s ads kept mum on pricing, it was because these adverts were designed to cater
to two distinct sets of consumers: those who were savvy on private tutoring and test-coaching,
and were well-aware of its cost; and those who desired to change their social status through postsecondary education, were aware of the existent customer base with disposable income, but may
have been disillusioned or discouraged if presented with the cost of a prep course—or more
metaphorically, the “hurdle” between their current state and their ambitions.
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CHAPTER TWO: LEGITIMACY BY DEFAULT: THE TEST-PREP
INDUSTRY’S ACQUISITION OF ACCEPTIBILITY, 1962-1979

“How well do the S.A.T.‟s perform their intended function of predicting college
grades? It depends on the college, but on the whole, in the purely statistical sense,
they do so no better than a man‟s weight indicates his height.”
--Banesh Hoffman161

In 1965, the debate over test-coaching seemed to be settled. At least, the College Board
seemed to believe so when it published Effects of Coaching on Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores.
Intended for “secondary school administrators, teachers, and counselors,” the booklet was
designed to inform readers over the preponderant scientific evidence against test-coaching.162 To
the dismay of all who believed that SAT scores could be augmented with concerted effort, the
College Board‟s pamphlet contained the results of seven studies that proved otherwise: coaching
could never raise SAT scores beyond statistically insignificant levels.
Indeed, the booklet was as much a dismissal of test-coaching as it was an open query on
why SAT coaching had grown without any proof of its effectiveness. The memorandum included
with the booklet—written by College Board President Richard Pearson—was no less adamant
about what was to blame for the growth of test-coaching, namely anything but the College
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Board.163 As far the College Board was concerned, the organization itself could not be blamed
for the rise of test-coaching (despite test-coaching‟s operational dependence upon the structure of
standardized testing), but it was obliged to prevent hardworking students and concerned parents
from committing the grievous sin of purchasing an SAT prep course.
Yet, Effects of Coaching on Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores ultimately did not settle any
debates over the legitimacy or ethicality of test-coaching. Between the early 1960s and late
1970s, the American educational system at-large underwent several crucial alterations. Some—
such as the Federal Trade Commission‟s investigation of Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Centers,
as well as New York State‟s Truth-in-Testing legislation—had a direct and obvious bearing on
the test prep industry. Others, such as the creation of the Department of Education, the advent of
performance contracting, and the Supreme Court Case Lemon v. Kurtzman, had an indirect but
no less important role in establishing the legal, ethical, and pedagogical boundaries of the
legitimacy of the test-prep industry. Ironically, by the end of the 1970s, the test-prep industry
attained legitimacy by default. The shifts in American education during the preceding two
decades had made the industry largely acceptable because it was not wholly unacceptable. In
order to describe these shifts, the official position of the College Board toward coaching at the
beginning of this period should be further discussed.

The College Board and Its Discontent
Another glance at Effects of Coaching on Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores will better
illustrate the rhetoric used by the College Board in its opposition to test-coaching. The authors of
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the pamphlet repeatedly denied the culpability of the College Board in fostering an educational
environment prone to SAT prep. Rather, the media was deemed responsible for accepting
advertisements from coaching schools, while parents were charged with being too ignorant when
demanding that educators should reprioritize their efforts. Principals and superintendents were
faulted for acquiescing to parents‟ demands for SAT review, and test coaches were labeled as
foolish for thinking that their SAT prep produced genuine results. The organization‟s trustees
went so far as to downplay the actual importance of the SAT in their official statement. If the
SAT was “merely supplementary to the school record” in a student‟s college application, then
high-schoolers ought to give little worry over the outcome of their SAT scores.164
Crucial to the College Board‟s argument was its clever definition of two key terms:
“coaching” and “aptitude.” The writers of the booklet defined coaching as “a variety of methods
used in attempting to increase in a relatively short time students‟ mastery of the particular skills,
concepts, and reasoning abilities tested by the SAT.”165 Such a definition has the appearance of
specificity, yet both “variety of methods” and “relatively short time” are vague enough terms to
warrant considerable confusion through their inherent ambiguity. The College Board
distinguished between legitimate teaching and dubious coaching by each job‟s level of direct
reference to the SAT itself without ever setting an actual threshold.
Likewise, the booklet‟s writers denied that aptitude was “fixed and impervious to
influence,” and instead defined it as “abilities that seem to grow slowly and stubbornly […] at
home and at school over the years, but not responding [sic] to hasty attempts to relive a young
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lifetime.”166 The College Board‟s defense of this definition resides in the phrase “slowly and
stubbornly,” indicating that the capacity to succeed in higher education, or to succeed in general,
could not be augmented overnight. This sentiment suggests that the intellectual molding of
children is not only a slow process, but also nearly set by the time an adolescent reaches the end
of their secondary schooling. In this vein, the capacity for collegiate education was built off of
the aptitude accumulated in one‟s youth, but such capacity was also referent to knowledge
different than what one would accrue in college.
However, the College Board‟s disapproval of test-coaching rested on the assertion that
SAT scores naturally tended to rise between students‟ junior and senior years of high school.
Hence, the College Board simultaneously maintained that the aptitude of a student was
impervious to concentrated instructional efforts, but that the several month period between a
typical student‟s first and second sitting for the SAT (generally including a summer holiday
without schooling) somehow accorded most students enough growth for statistically significant
or practical changes in their SAT scores. The agency resolved this contradiction by deducing that
any gains made by students on their SAT scores after test-coaching could not be attributed to
test-coaching because these gains became statistically insignificant when one factored out the
average gain made by students on the SAT between their junior and senior years. Given that the
average gains made by students on successive attempts at the SAT could well have been a
composite of very high gains and considerable losses, those children who raised their SAT scores
considerably after test-prep may have been able to do so without coaching.167
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Following the trustees‟ official statement, Effects of Coaching presents summaries for
seven studies designed to prove the uselessness of test-coaching, albeit with convoluted
methodology and heady reasoning. The first report discussed, Henry Dyer‟s 1953 study on the
effect of coaching on SAT performance for boys at a college preparatory school, illustrates the
Board‟s ideas on what actions constitute coaching. During the seven months between the
baseline-test and post-test, Dyer‟s experimental subjects were accorded only six hours of verbal
coaching and four hours of mathematical coaching, for which “neither instructors nor students
were given answers to” the ten-to-thirty minute coaching lessons.168
Instead, Dyer and the College Board presumed that one ought to be able to use logical
reasoning to solve SAT questions (e.g., analogy or geometry questions) because it should be the
same logical reasoning one is taught in school and experiences in society. Hence, coaching
methods would be useless because they only reiterated the same logical reasoning patterns seen
at home and in school. Ironically, Dyer assumed that children from sub-standard schools or lessaffluent homes would not benefit from coaching either, as there simply was not enough time to
correct sixteen to eighteen years of ignorance. Dyer‟s conclusion is affirmed regardless of the
findings. The cart supported the horse. Unsurprisingly, the boys of School X achieved average
gains on their SAT-Verbal score only 4.6 points higher than the gains made by their peers at
School Y. Although the SAT-Mathematics scores of coached students who weren‟t enrolled in a
math course rose on average 29.2 points higher than those scores of similar un-coached students,
Dyer still deemed coaching to generate statistically insignificant results.169
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These findings are followed (and reaffirmed) by a summary for John French‟s 1955 study
on the impact of test-coaching on the SAT scores of children from public schools. Like Dyer,
French employed a curious framework for coaching. The 126 Massachusetts seniors in the study
who received verbal coaching were provided with “an average of 90 minutes [with] the school‟s
special 500-word vocabulary list,” permission to briefly view an easily-accessible publication not
designed for the SAT, and one and one-half hours of access to facsimile SAT-Verbal questions
sometime in the seven-month gap between the study‟s pre-test and post-test.170 The 188 other
Massachusetts students in the experimental group were given “[twenty] special assignments” of
facsimile SAT-Math and SAT-Verbal items designed by ETS.171 The average gains made by
both coached groups were declared statistically insignificant when compared to those made by a
control group from Michigan on respective post-tests.
However, these findings also illustrate the College Board‟s rather broad view on the
statistical significance of SAT scores. French based his findings off of “the standard error of
measurement” for the SAT, or, the expected sway for any given individual‟s performance on the
SAT were they to repeatedly take the examination.172 The writers of Effects of Coaching noted
that the SAT-Verbal and SAT-Math had standard errors of measurement of 32 and 34 points,
respectively. Students with average results on the SAT could earn scores dozens of points higher
or lower on subsequent administrations of the exam yet not make statistically significant
changes, despite what students, parents, teachers, or admissions officers may have believed.
Further, the report suggested the belief that such a broad standard error of measurement did not
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necessarily penalize students who may have had an “off” day, or unfavorably rewarded students
who eked out a performance just over a college‟s tacit cutoff point for applicants.
The seven studies in the pamphlet, the most recent of which conducted in 1962, served as
the rhetorical and scientific basis for College Board‟s disdain toward test-coaching. Yet, Effects
of Coaching was by no means the College Board or ETS‟s final edict on the horrors of test-prep
during the 1960s and 1970s. Coffman and Neun‟s 1966 study concluded that coaching students
with speed-reading techniques did not improve SAT-Verbal scores as the college freshman used
in the experiment showed no significant aggregate improvement. Roberts and Oppenheim‟s 1966
investigation of the PSAT‟s coachability concluded that socioeconomically disadvantaged
youths would not benefit from, and could harmed by, test-coaching. Meanwhile, a 1979 study by
Alderman and Powers determined that students coached for the SAT-Verbal section typically
answered only one more question correctly than un-coached students. 173 The College Board
continuously felt compelled to demonstrate that its distrust of test-coaching was rooted in its
faith in psychometric evidence and not the urge to maintain business viability.
However, Effects of Coaching on Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores did not silence those
who had had qualms with the SAT, most notable of whom being the mathematician Banesh
Hoffman. Hoffman argued that the state of standardized testing was “not only dangerous but in a
profound sense unscientific.”174 Psychometricians manipulated statistics in order to claim that
questions were well-written and answers were logically sound. The design of standardized tests
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rewarded those who shallowly applied knowledge, and penalized students who noticed the
nuance and ambiguity within many exam questions. In turn, the attempt to measure intelligence
through multiple-choice standardized tests was an anti-intellectual exercise in quantifying
intangible qualities. In Hoffman‟s view, other versions of multiple-choice standardized testing,
such as the Westinghouse Science Talent Search, made an “incredible mockery of sense and
science” in the aim to reduce the potential number of high-scoring test-takers.175 Yet, Hoffman‟s
ire may be seen as part of a broader academic scrutiny on the limits of standardized testing, as
well as the capabilities of the test-taking audience.

Wising Up, Dumbing Down, and Aiming For the Middle
Though many psychometricians denied the effectiveness of test-coaching, some began to
accept during the 1960s and 1970s the possibility that performances on aptitude and achievement
tests could be swayed by individuals‟ respective reactions to the composition of the tests
themselves. Researchers embarked upon qualifying and quantifying “test-wiseness,” or, the
ability to manipulate “the characteristics and formats of the test and/or the test taking situation to
receive a high score.”176 The touchstone for much research on test-wiseness is a 1965 article
composed by Jason Millman, Carol Bishop, and Robert Ebel (himself a former researcher for
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ETS), who argued that a student‟s level of test-wiseness was “logically independent of the
[student‟s] knowledge of the subject matter.”177 Students who had a middling grasp on an exam‟s
content could still fare well if they could use the exam‟s format to their advantage.
Millman, Bishop, and Ebel were unable to discern whether test-wiseness was a teachable
concept or a broader aptitude innate to a person. However, the researchers did qualify two types
of test-wiseness. Some aspects, such as pacing strategies, guessing techniques, and deductive
reasoning, were found to operate “independent of test construction or test purpose.” 178 Others
elements of test-wiseness, such as recognizing recurrent patterns in erroneous answer choices, or
thinking only as sophisticatedly as the design of the exam, relied on the particular design of an
exam. Since these techniques allowed many students to perform better on exams than their
knowledge of the material examined ought to have warranted, the researchers believed that testwiseness needed further investigation in order to determine how to reduce tests‟ vulnerability to
test-wiseness. Rather than reward savvy and recognize sophisticated thinking as a facet of
intelligence in its own right, certain psychometricians and educational psychologists of the 1960s
saw test-wiseness as an impediment to actually measuring students‟ aptitudes.
Concerns rose as several studies attempted to determine if test-wiseness could be taught
to students and then successfully applied to examinations. In a 1968 study for the American
Educational Research Journal, Leonard Kreit compared the IQ test scores of two groups of
Indiana third-graders: those who were administered an IQ test “at the beginning and end of the
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school year,” and those who were administered several IQ tests throughout the school year.179
Kreit‟s results were inconclusive. While the experimental group did retain augmented IQ scores
through their final examination, the control also improved their IQ test scores on the end-of-year
exam, thus rendering the experimental group‟s level of improvement less than statistically
significant. However, a study published in the Winter, 1970, edition of The Journal of
Educational Measurement lent credence to the notion that test-wiseness was trainable and
retainable. The authors of the study subjected two groups of high school seniors to one of “[t]wo
programmed texts” that taught elimination and guessing strategies for multiple-choice tests.180
Each experimental group served as the other‟s respective control. After testing both groups the
day following and two weeks after their instruction with the 40-minute programmed tests, the
researchers concluded that elements of test-wiseness could be coached and retained.
Yet, as more psychometricians and educational psychologists became keen to the concept
of test-wiseness, American youth became increasingly unable to perform well on the SAT.
Peaking in the 1962-63 academic year with a combined score of 980, the average SAT score had
declined to 951 by the end of the 1960s.181 In turn, SAT scores were declining for the yearly pool
of students who took the examination in the spring of their junior year of high school and then
retook the exam in the winter of their senior year. Quite often, students sat for the exam in March
or May, and did so once again December or January. The average improvement for these
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candidates declined considerably between 1962 and 1968.182 Each year, students were
performing more poorly than their predecessors, and were making less significant improvements
in their SAT scores when retaking the exam. When pressed for an explanation, researchers could
only surmise that “students [tended] to repeat the test regardless of their initial score.”183 If more
students retook the SAT, then the chance of significant aggregate levels of improvement between
tests diminished. By the mid-1970s, SAT candidates were exhibiting not only poorer aggregate
average performance, but also increasingly infrequent exceptional scores. In 1975, only 15
percent of test takers received section scores above 600, a decline of three percent in as many
years.184
By the mid-1970s, the College Board began to hunt for what was responsible for the
protracted SAT score decline. Just as in Effects of Coaching, the only suspect ruled out by the
College Board was the SAT itself. In a brief essay for The English Journal, the College Board‟s
executive director asserted that “the SAT score scale [had] continued to have highly consistent
meaning,” and that examinees‟ aggregate performances were truly responsible for the cause for
the decline.185 This sentiment was reaffirmed in 1977, when both ETS and the College Board
organized an advisory panel to determine the roots of the continued decline in SAT scores. The
findings were subsequently published as the report On Further Examination. The panel declared
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that the factor most responsible for the SAT-score decline was the “change in the composition of
the student group taking the test,” or in less gilt terms, poor and minority students.186 With
rhetorical plodding, the panel validated this claim by arguing that the SAT itself was an
unfaltering assessment of aptitude, and that its ability to predict students‟ college marks was
stable.187 If all test-takers‟ scores were referent to a scoring scale left untouched since the early
1940s, then one could not blame the decline on the structure of SAT scores. However arbitrary a
1340 or 870 score may have been, the numbers had consistent meaning.
However, the panel contradicted itself two paragraphs later by admitting that “an „upward
drift‟ of between 8 and 12 points in the scaling of the scores” occurred between 1963 and
1973.188 If SAT performances routinely registered nearly a dozen points higher in 1973 than they
would have a decade prior, then such variance casts doubt on the focus of statistical significance
with the scores. That is, if the range of eight to twelve scaled points was statistically insignificant
within the scaled score range of the SAT, then making note of this variance was without merit
unless its omission would have placed the overall score decline within statistical significance.
Yet, the report reaffirmed that any disproportionate faith placed in aptitude tests during the
college admissions process was the fault of admissions officers and not the College Board.
Rather, the panel for On Further Examination deduced that the protracted decline in SAT
scores was symptomatic of decaying American educational standards. The panel lamented the
expanse of college-going students “with barely a speaking acquaintance with the English
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language and no writing facility at all.”189 In turn, the Board blamed the decreased correlation
between SAT scores and first-year college grades not on the exam‟s diminished relevance, but
on grade inflation. That is, the exam had not gotten harder, but education had become simpler.
Further, the panel expressed grave concerns about how SAT scores may have been negatively
influenced by the role of “tape recorders, films[,] film strips, television[…] and the like” in the
modern pedagogical process.190 This was ironic given that the first president of ETS marveled
over the educational possibilities of such media. Nonetheless, the point was clear. The
educational structure of America had writ large loosened its standards beyond acceptable
standards, and test prep was but one of many factors.
Psychometric pride aside, why would the College Board and ETS be so persistent in
affirming their standardized tests‟ stability and un-coachability? As Edward Fiske noted in his
journalistic work for the New York Times, one cannot ignore the demographic shift of college
students during the 1960s; “the number of persons in college soared from 3,582,700 to
7,920,000” between 1960 and 1970.191 In turn, the value of standardized tests and entrance
exams grew because they were a more convenient way to discern who among the increasingly
broader pool of college hopefuls were truly capable of tackling higher education. One may
surmise that the value of test prep also grew due to this massive growth of the college-bound and
college-hopeful populations. If more people sought to attend college, more people may have
sought a way to distinguish themselves through impressive test scores.
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Demographics for New York City show that labor responsibilities for adolescents were
considerably lower by the beginning of the 1970s that they had been in previous decades. Of the
740,627 city residents between sixteen and nineteen years of age in 1970, only 261,067 were
members of the labor force, and 236,029 of them were actively and non-militarily employed at
the time. The figures for younger legally employable minors were far lower, as merely 27,678 of
the city‟s 412,437 fourteen- and fifteen-year old residents were in the labor force. Of those
24,211 fourteen- and fifteen-year olds in the city who were actively employed in 1970, only
7,023 (less than two percent of all city youth in that age group) were working full-time.192
Although one cannot ignore instances of minors employed outside the formal economic sector,
one may reason that adolescents had a diminished obligation to be a source of income for their
family. (Or, perhaps, employers saw little incentive in employing younger minors beyond parttime status.)
The advent of the American College Testing Program (ACT) may have also spurred the
College Board and ETS to be persistent in claiming their exams‟ un-coachability. Developed by
E.F. Lundquist and Ted McCarrell, both of the State University of Iowa, the ACT was crafted to
“evaluate intellectual capacities in English, mathematics, social studies, and the natural
sciences,” thus ostensibly seeking to measure more skills than the SAT did.193 In turn, the ACT
catered to those American colleges and universities that felt neglected by the College Board and
ETS. Most of these institutions were in the western, northwestern, and midwestern United States,
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and felt that the College Board examinations only reinforced elitism from and through
northeastern schools.
The development of the ACT also occurred when Americans were consumed with “the
search for „education for survival.‟”194 The 36,399,802 American youths in primary and
secondary schools at the turn of the 1960s could not be wrongly lulled through poor education
into accepting a position subservient to the Soviet Union. Like the College Board and ETS, the
ACT program also kept tabs on its test-takers‟ initial college marks. Unlike the arbiters of the
SAT, the directors of the ACT placed great emphasis on using such information to see if the high
school curricula of test-takers had adequately prepared them for collegiate-level work.195
Lindquist did not see the ACT as a test that would mimic the SAT in either style or purpose.
Instead of “‟skimming the cream off the top,‟” the ACT was designed to “delet[e] the least
qualified from the bottom.‟”196 If the exam‟s purpose was to merely discount those students who
showed a lack of adequate collegiate-level capabilities, then the exam shifted the purpose of
taking standardized entrance tests. The aim was no longer pursuing the most prestigious
institutions, but rather demonstrating that one would be a good fit at some college, somewhere.
In its first year alone, the ACT attracted a considerable number of examination
candidates. According to the New York Times, “125,604 college applicants took part in the
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program” during the 1959-1960 academic year.197 However, a 1961 study conducted by Frank
Peters and Eugenia Plog may have dispelled some of the test‟s early accolades. The researchers
studied the efficacy of the ACT as a substitute for Ohio State University‟s series of mathematics
and English entry-placement exams. Peters and Plog noted that the ACT, when taken as a whole,
was slightly more effective than the precedent Ohio State Psychological Examination, but that
the scores from the ACT‟s subtests tended to prompt student placement in too-simple English
and math courses.198
Even if researchers found early imperfections in the ACT‟s capabilities, the examination
still created more mainstream space into which the test-prep industry could wriggle. As Stanley
Kaplan noted in his autobiography, the ACT had made those in charge of the College Board and
ETS nervous, as the organizations could have lost their authority had the exam initially became
popular in regions that were traditionally SAT-strongholds.199 However, the ACT first gained
strength outside of the eastern United States, thus increasing the possibility of any collegehopeful student of having to take a standardized entrance exam.200 Although the original purpose
of the ACT was to winnow out only those seemingly deficient in college-level aptitude, Peters
and Plog‟s study indicate that universities were willing to use ACT results to cordon students by
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their different entry-level capabilities: the standardized test also became the placement exam.
This may have potentially created a broader test-prep market. Students could use coaching not
only to get in, but also to better secure more advanced classes, and in turn, a timelier graduation.

Push the Button, Win a Prize
Test-prep entrepreneurs did not benefit solely from a broadened standardized testing
field. The industry also became more acceptable due to pedagogical and judicial developments in
the American educational system at-large. One educational phenomenon during the late 1960s
and early 1970s that may have affected the American public‟s later opinions of the test-prep
industry was performance contracting. Developed by the Office of Economic Opportunity,
performance contracting “involve[d] payment of incentives to students, teachers, and private
educational contractors, depending on improvements in student performance.”201 The
organization allotted grant money to businesses and corporations that designed accelerated
learning programs for children who had considerably deficient reading and mathematics skills.
Such programs were premised on developing students‟ skills through the use of “teaching
machines,” proto-computer devices programmed with tutorials that doled out instruction at the
student‟s own pace of learning.202 When students showed progress in their studies, they were
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then given rewards, ranging from trinkets to spare change to electronic goods, depending on the
rate and level of a student‟s improvement.203
However, proponents of these programs maintained that “[r]egardless of the variety of
methods, materials, and approaches […] the single most important factor contributing to the
success of a [performance contracting] reading program is the teacher.”204 This sentiment
parallels the beliefs espoused by Chauncey in ETS‟s early Annual Reports. Educational Testing
Service stressed that teaching contained a certain irreducible, ineffable element, one that could
not be replaced by any set of educational programming or testing. Performance contractors felt
likewise. Conversely, test prep could be defined as something besides teaching simply because
its aims could be fully defined. If all the components of standardized test preparation could be
fully defined through its methods, then it did not depend upon the mysterious and un-categorical
aspect of a good teacher, and thus, was illegitimate.
The first instance of performance contracting occurred in Texarkana, Arkansas, when the
city‟s school district hired Dorsett Educational Systems to improve the basic skills of students
“who had been identified as being two years or more behind grade level.”205 Using a series of
film strips, Dorsett sought to improve each student‟s mastery of basic skills by one grade level
within 80 instructional hours. For every student who met this guideline, Dorsett was
compensated $80, while accelerated and retarded rates of improvement were inversely
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compensated.206 The practice of performance contracting soon gained luster, and by the fall of
1970, the Office of Economic Opportunity had allocated $6.5 million for performance
contracting programs in twenty school districts.207 That same year, the school board of Gary,
Indiana entered a direct, four-year arrangement with Behavioral Research Laboratory, albeit
without funding from the O.E.O. nor clear contractual stipulations. To the dismay of the Gary‟s
teachers‟ union, Behavioral Research Laboratories would act as “manage[r of] Banneker
Elementary,” a school that had found to be poorly administered and underperforming by the
Indiana Board of Education.208
Ironically, businesses that entered into performance contracting arrangements with school
districts often had to produce results superior to those that had been made by the school systems
in order to receive monetary re-compensation or profit. Most performance contracts
arrangements stipulated that businesses would not recoup their expenditures for students who did
not display a rate of learning quicker than what they had achieved in school. These programs
typically had to “improve students‟ performance in reading and mathematics by 1.6 grades in
order to break even,” even though the average student enrolled in a performance contract
program accelerated at less than one-third this rate during an academic year of traditional
schooling.209 Hence, in order to be seen as suitable alternatives or supplements for traditional
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education, performance contractors had to generate results superior to what schools had been
capable of producing.
As quickly as performance contracting had gained acceptability across the country, the
theory lost its appeal just as quickly, especially after an investigation of Dorsett‟s Texarkana
program revealed “that students had been, in advance, taught the answers to test questions.”210
By early 1972, the Office of Economic Opportunity deemed its experiment with performance
contracting wholly unsuccessful.211 The public distrust of performance contractors, and similarly,
test-prep companies, was rooted in a sense of fraud: educational programs and practices feel
fraudulent when they only serve their own extant purposes. Dorsett became regarded as
fraudulent because students were allegedly coached for post-course examination that determined
the level of compensation the company would receive. This public disapproval was similar to the
public dismissal of test-prep companies as little more than “cram schools,” where students were
force-fed questions.
The burden of proof found in performance contracting profit margins had an analogue in
the burden of proof for the test-prep industry. For ETS, and in turn, the American public, the
test-prep industry could not claim success any time a student who had purchased a prep course
performed well on a standardized test. Rather, these parties would grant test-prep companies
credence only when students‟ scores surpassed not only a threshold of statistical significance, but
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also the level of improvement arbitrarily deemed attributable to additional schooling and mental
maturation. Akin to performance contracting, test-prep companies had to surpass traditional
measures of test readiness in order to be seen as legitimate educational devices.
Federal judicial rulings also created space for the test-prep industry during this time
period, especially in the United States Supreme Court case Lemon v. Kurtzman. Originating in
the U.S District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania, the case dealt with the constitutionality of
funding the secular aspects of sectarian nonpublic education with state gambling taxes.212 Nine
parties filed suit against State Superintendant Donald Kurtzman as well as the heads of several
sectarian private schools, maintaining that the Pennsylvania Nonpublic School Aid Act breached
the separation of church and state. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that state law “‟perpetuate[d]
and promote[d] segregation‟” because of the inherent discriminatory nature of nonpublic
education, religious or otherwise.213 The Court, led by Chief Justice Warren Burger, found in
favor of the plaintiffs in June, 1971. As Cornelius Golden noted, the Court found actions taken
through the Pennsylvania Nonpublic School Aid Act created “excessive entanglement [between
church and State…] in the aggregate but perhaps not individually.”214 The case did bounce back
to the Supreme Court the following year after the East Pennsylvania District Court “permitted
[Pennsylvania] to reimburse nonpublic sectarian schools for services provided before [the
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Supreme Court‟s] decision in Lemon I.”215 The Supreme Court upheld the District Court‟s ruling,
citing precedence on nonretroactive activity.
If Lemon placed a thicker barrier between religious education and state and federal
governmental funding, then the Court‟s decision may have also allowed nonpublic educational
institutions and enterprises greater pedagogical leeway. As Golden noted in his discussion of
Lemon’s relationship to school vouchers, education is not a constitutionally-guaranteed right—
but rather, a facet of everyday life that could be considered a “fundamental interest.”216 This
point may be used to consider the relationship between government and all nonpublic education
during the 1970s. While the precedent case Everson v. Board of Education “demonstrated the
permeability of the wall” between church and state in the context of education, Lemon v.
Kurtzman established that this wall was not overly porous.217 Given that the federal government
could give neither preferential nor prejudicial treatment toward nonpublic education, sectarian or
otherwise, then Lemon only helped strengthen the libertarian principles of nonpublic education
and educational principles.
Corollary to Lemon, the advent of school voucher programs prompted educational
theorists and critics to argue over the ethicality and constitutionality of charter school programs.
These nascent debates centered on what the reasonable boundaries were for “the [demand] of
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education consumers.”218 The viability of school voucher programs rested on the belief that
education, while a necessity, was subject to the same market conditions as other vital goods and
services. In a voucher system, educational “proprietors—public and private[…]—would compete
for the custom of buyers (parents) all of whom have been made substantially equal in their power
to purchase admission”219 A school‟s tuition would be variable, respective to a family‟s income,
with poorer families paying more nominal fees and richer families contributing heftier sums.
John Coons and Stephen Sugarman, who collaborated to draft the Family Choice in
Education Act (FCEA), believed that voucher programs would help “purge public education of
discrimination against poor districts and poor people.”220 The men argued that school districts
had become illegitimate units of educational oversight because they could not guarantee parity of
either educational quality or opportunity. Like Lemon, school voucher programs created space
for the test-prep industry within American education. If the extant educational system unsuitably
prepared broad patches of American youth for the working world or higher education, then the
test-prep industry served as part of a broad spectrum of alternative approaches, or at least a
suitable stop-gap, for those who could afford such measures.

Stumbling Toward Acceptability
Perhaps the biggest hurdle for test-prep companies to clear was the Federal Trade
Commission‟s (FTC‟s) investigation of the industry during the late 1970s. Given the vast
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expansion of the college-going and college-hopeful populations during the previous two decades,
as well as the spectacular claims that certain test-prep companies made about their ability to raise
test scores, the FTC felt it necessary to probe into the $60-million industry to assess its ethicality
and legality. Although plans to investigate the test-prep industry were first announced in late
1976, the commission‟s report would not be finished for another two and a-half years. The
results, however, would directly alter the relationship between standardized test manufacturers,
test-coaches, and the American public.221
With its investigation, the FTC‟s Bureau of Consumer Protection sought to “estimate
statistically the impact of commercial coaching on SAT scores.”222 However, the Bureau
explicitly stressed in the introduction of its report that the investigation could not be categorized
as experimental as there was no un-coached control group to which the students of the coaching
schools under investigation would be compared. Although more statistically- and scientificallysound results may have been attained by arranging a control group, the Bureau expressed in its
report that such actions would have been financially and ethically unsound. The Bureau felt that
they could not “[deny] access to commercial coaching to students who want[ed] it.”223 Should
coaching have proven effective, parents may have been incensed over a policy that hobbled their
children‟s chances on the SAT. Investigators for the Bureau analyzed the records of “three
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coaching schools in the New York metropolitan area” for the academic years between 1974 and
1977.224 The investigators soon dropped one of these programs from its investigation due to its
overly-small clientele pool. The customer information for the two remaining schools was
corroborated against ETS and College Board files for all SAT candidates who resided in the
same postal-code hubs as the majority of the coaching schools‟ clientele.
However, the companies under investigation were not initially eager to relinquish their
clienteles‟ personal information, which led to arbitration in the United States District Court for
the State of Massachusetts. In Federal Trade Commission v. Stanley H. Kaplan Educational
Center, Ltd., et al, the FTC petitioned the court to have Kaplan comply with a subpoena duces
tecum.225 Presiding judge D.J. Tauro deferred in part to the decision made by the Supreme Court
in FCC v. Schreiber. Tauro noted that Schreiber set the precedent that “courts should not
substitute their judgment for that of regulatory agencies more familiar with the industries they
are charged with regulating.”226 Hence, the court would not honor Kaplan and others‟ request
because the FTC had a better understanding of what would be necessary for a thorough and valid
investigation.
Once obtained, the files of these SAT-prep course clients were then referenced against
ETS‟s list of SAT candidates from the New York metropolitan area for the three academic years
under question. Coaching school files that lacked corroboration in ETS‟s files were disregarded.
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From this process, the Bureau identified 1,568 coached students. This pool was further
winnowed to roughly 1,000; coached students who never took the SAT, took it outside the New
York City metropolitan area, or took the ACT instead were discounted.227 Meanwhile, the
Bureau randomly selected the SAT-score records for 2,500 un-coached students from ETS‟s
files; this latter group served as the non-experimental control.
The investigators also sought to clarify any preexisting discrepancies between the control
and experimental groups by comparing their respective responses on the Student Demographic
Questionnaire (SDQ), which was administered during each examination date for the SAT and
“voluntarily completed by […] students.”228 Investigators determined that students who attended
a coaching school tended to have higher course marks and PSAT scores than their un-coached
peers. Coached students were more often than not “A” students in their English and math
courses, while un-coached students were more often than not “B” students in these same
subjects. The income figures between the two groups present a starker difference. Over twofifths of the coached students came from families whose parental incomes exceeded $30,000 per
year, a figure which, if adjusted for inflation for the years between 1974 and 1978, would have
an income equivalency range of $100,322 to $132,691 in 2010. Meanwhile, nearly one-half of
the un-coached students came from households with incomes less than $18,000 per year. When
this figure is similarly adjusted for inflation, it gives an income equivalency range of $60,199 to
$79,614 in 2010.229
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Investigators employed multiple regression analyses in order to best gauge the genuine
impact of coaching on test scores. This statistical technique was preferred to others because it
allowed the “ability to analyze the impact of one variable on another variable while [… holding
constant] the effects of several other factors.”230 Given the sheer variance within the SAT
candidacy in any given exam administration, the Bureau found it necessary to program their
analyses to account for gender, income, high school marks, class rank, high school type, PSAT
scores, and distance between PSAT and SAT sittings. Hence, the effect of test-prep on test
performance could not be easily accused of being unfairly augmented or mitigated.
The Bureau determined “that coaching was effective at one of the two schools.”231
Stanley H Kaplan Educational Centers produced, on average, a fifty-point increase in customers‟
composite SAT scores. However, this figure is somewhat misleading as the average rates of
improvement attributable to coaching among the four different testing dates used in the study
varied from 35.1 points to 71 points. When confidence intervals were considered, the rate of
improvement attributable to Kaplan‟s coaching ranged from 31 to 67 points, and among
individual test dates, confidence intervals ranged from 2 points to 96 points. The other coaching
school under investigation, Test-preparation Center, Inc., had drearier results. On average,
students coached by Test-preparation Center had a mere 3.6-point improvement on their
composite SAT scores, and their performances on the verbal section tended to slightly decline. 232
A perusal of Test-preparation Center‟s advertisements in the New York Times reveals a
fundamental difference between their and Kaplan‟s operations. Bizarre interaction with the
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NSATI aside, Kaplan refused to operate without preponderant control over its material. Stanley
Kaplan went so far as to hand-pick new center managers during the early expansion of his
business in order to ensure that every office outside of New York City operated according to his
standards233. However, as seen in a 1975 ad in the New York Times, the Bronx-based Testpreparation Center did not necessarily engage in such tight-knit management:
PART TIME [:] Hi profit biz oppty [sic] created by & for educators. Administer
and educational program in your community. Contact TEST-PREPARATION
CENTERS, Inc., 3701 Henry Hudson Pkwy, Suite „D‟, Riverdale, N.Y. [:] 212796-1076 234
For a “low investment,” one could manage a Test-preparation Centers branch.235 The
company also directly courted teachers in the classifieds section of the Times. Test-preparation
Center offered math teachers fifteen dollars per hour for part-time after-school work on
Wednesday afternoons. For one 105-minute class, a teacher could earn $26.25—a figure with the
same purchasing power as $106.37 in 2010.236 Although the company openly advertising the
wages it would pay its employees, it did not use its advertisements to specify how much its SAT-
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prep and speed-reading courses cost. Readers were only told that there would be a “DISCOUNT
for Early Registration.”237
Yet, the Bureau heavily mitigated its findings in the report‟s second half. The
investigators were insistent on demonstrating the fallacy in “concluding that School A [Kaplan]
„works‟ and School B [Test-preparation] does not.”238 The ability to diminish the findings
depended upon the adherence to a buzzword of objective standardized testing,
“underachievement.” According to the investigators, if students did poorly on the SAT “given
their demographics and other personal characteristics” before being coached, then coaching may
not have caused genuine improvement.239 More bluntly, if a coaching school led students to live
up to expectations, then such improvement was not from genuine coaching. Such students were
led to coaching through self-selection, i.e., recognizing the range of their alleged capabilities,
rather than the desire to attain outstanding SAT scores.
Had the Bureau unequivocally reported that certain coaching schools could consistently
produce genuine improvement in students‟ SAT scores, then Educational Testing Service might
have been in an unenviable position. However, ETS may have been partially responsible for the
tone of the Bureau‟s final product. R. Jeffrey Smith alleged that the Federal Trade Commission
was “[h]arassed by [ETS] and nervous about a document lending credence to a suspect
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industry.”240 The FTC decided to release the document only after a considerable delay and with
several pointed caveats—and following the resignation of Arthur Levine, who oversaw the
investigation.241 When questioned, Consumer Affairs staffers remarked that the findings did not
“provide enough information to question the legitimacy of standardized tests themselves”; the
study lacked a scientifically genuine control group of students, and thus could not be trusted
beyond a minimal degree.242
Yet the FTC‟s findings—however tepid—were enough for the test-prep industry to claim
a quantum of legitimacy. Following the report, Stanley Kaplan used rhetorical deference to give
his company extra credibility. By asserting that “‟cram courses do not help,‟” Kaplan distanced
his company from its competition, but also implied to the public that the test-prep industry
should not be seen as a cohort of enterprises with a shared agenda or product, but merely a broad
spectrum of companies dependent upon the continued use of standardized exams.243 Although
the FTC study sought to determine if the test-prep industry had engaged in consumer fraud, the
results may have ironically spurred some justification for certain test-prep companies to demand
high prices for their goods. Whereas Test-preparation Center charged $75 for its SAT prep
course, Kaplan charged $250.244 Even factoring in the number of hours spent in direct classroom
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instruction, a client would have paid $3.125 per hour of instruction at Test-preparation Center
versus $6.25 per hour at Kaplan. This per-hour cost comparison may seem somewhat misleading
because, as noted earlier, Kaplan had devised dozens of hours of supplemental audio material
students could use while at a Kaplan center. But, the use of such material was optional, as a
client could use as much or as little of Kaplan‟s Test-n-Tape system as he or she desired.
Regardless, the FTC report may have reinforced and popularized Kaplan‟s method of
operation; one paid considerably more for test-prep not for what one is required to do in a prep
course, but for the myriad possible ways one could prep using a company‟s materials. If a
student were to customize and fully use the supplementary material, then Kaplan and its
analogues could reinforce the claim that they were engaging in long-term, multidimensional
coaching, and that such holistic learning did not come cheaply. Conversely, clients who ignored
the various additional materials could be dismissed as careless students and thoughtless
consumers, since the company‟s numerous provisions mitigated that company‟s burden in
guaranteeing significant test score improvement.

More For Less: The Creation of the Department of Education
The test-prep industry‟s acquisition of legitimacy also had a bureaucratic tether: the
creation of the Department of Education. Prior to 1979, the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) was the executive bureaucratic apparatus responsible for the oversight of
American education. President Carter found the department unsuitable and unsustainable for this
purpose. Although Carter had pledged during his presidential campaign to create a Department
of Education, he waited until his 1978 State of the Union address to Congress to publicly re-
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approach the idea of restructuring the executive Cabinet. Amplified attention to the creation of a
separate department for education did not develop until October, 1978, when Carter personally,
and unsuccessfully, urged Speaker of the House Tip O‟Neill to rally support for the passage of
the House version of the Department of Education Origin Act.245
In the 1979 State of the Union address, Carter‟s educational agenda included a
reassurance to the American public that the proposed Cabinet addition would not lead to federal
dicta on the nature of American education. To Carter, the proposed department would instead
serve as a “responsive and reliable partner with states, localities, and private institutions.”246 The
government would not usurp power away from the traditional arbiters of pedagogical direction.
Indeed, the president hoped that a department for education would “keep the Federal
Government out of the administration and the decision-making involving public education.”247
To this end, Carter repeatedly argued during the summer of 1979 that an extra apparatus for
education was needed in order to slim down the executive bureaucracy as well as reduce federal
involvement in the direction American education. Over two and-a-half years into his term
Carter‟s aims materialized when the House approved the Department of Education Organization
Act during the last week of September, 1979. The Senate‟s version of the bill cleared conference
scrutiny at the same time.
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Public Law 96-88, signed by Carter on 17 October, 1979, attempted to retain the limited
scope that the president sought for the new department. Within the law‟s introductory findings,
the 96th Congress stated that “parents have the primary responsibility for the education of their
children, and states, localities, and private institutions have the primary responsibility for
supporting that role.”248 If parents are the arbiters of education, then their actions are limited
solely by the legality of those educational institutions they choose their children to attend, and
not necessarily by the quality of the resultant education. In turn, if private institutions served a
role in the execution of parents‟ educational demands, then education was rendered similar to a
commodity subject to oversight. Education was legitimate so long as it was not legally
illegitimate.
As stated in the law‟s next clause, the preponderance of governmental authority over
education rested in state governments, which in turn granted that authority to school systems and
superintendents. Given the assumed legality and legitimacy of each state‟s educational system, as
well each state‟s local school systems‟ varying interpretations of statutes, the new department
was left with the broad roles of “management and coordination of Federal education
programs.”249 In turn, Congress maintained that communities and localities, as the purest sources
of educational direction and policy, included a variety of educational locations. That is,
education was not merely limited to the school, but also “libraries, museums, […] the workplace,
[…] and the home.”250 If the provision of a child‟s education and molding had supplemental
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elements in the community, then these elements were also largely outside the jurisdiction of the
Department of Education. The department could not place restrictions on these extracurricular
environments of learning, whatever the nature of this learning may be, unless it was in violation
of federal law. Nor could the department obstruct the use of new technologies or pedagogical
theories, unless they denied equal opportunity in learning.
Put simply, the department was given a broad mission with a short leash. The law
mandated that the new department was to engender “the general welfare of the United States”
through education, but not “the authority of the Federal Government over education.”251 As
stated in Section 103, (b) of the law, both the Secretary and Department of Education were
bound to accept curricular content, “library resources, textbooks, or other instructional materials
by any educational institution or school system,” save those in violation of federal law.252
Decisions over proprietary education could not be easily addressed with the new department‟s
organization. Public Law 96-88 created six assistant secretary positions for the department, each
with the responsibility to oversee a specific facet of education: primary and secondary education;
post-secondary education; “vocational and adult education”; “special education and
rehabilitation service”; “educational research and improvement;” and civil rights.253 Contrary to
Carter‟s promises, there was no assistant secretary position for private education. Hence, the
legality—and, in turn, educational legitimacy—of proprietary educational establishments and
enterprises depended upon the decisions of other federal departments and the legislative branch.
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With this, the Department of Education did not have the authority to deem the test-prep
industry legitimate or illegitimate. That judgment call could only come from the Federal Trade
Commission. As heavily mitigated as the final version of the FTC‟s Bureau of Consumer Affairs
investigation of the test-prep industry was, the report never clearly gave clear support or
disapproval of the industry‟s practices or existence. In short, the industry‟s legal and educational
legitimacy was granted by default. The FTC could not prove beyond doubt, nor truly beyond
skepticism, that all elements of the test-prep industry behaved unethically. The provisions of
Public Law 96-88 compelled the Department of Education to defer to precedent federal decisions
and local educational customs. The industry was acceptable because it was not unacceptable.

Truth in Testing
At the end of the 1970s, the American public had grown weary of the clandestine
operations of standardized test makers, in particular, those of ETS. Foremost among the
crusaders against standardized testing were Ralph Nader and Allan Nairn. Nader alleged that
higher education was viewed as a symbolic rather than a substantive goal. The symbolic goal of
college education was empty because the intangible and overarching skills one ought to have
learned in higher education were not applied to societal uplift. With this, Nader became the
mentor of one “Allan Nairn of Princeton University,” who formed a Public Interest Research
Group (PIRG) in order to investigate the practices of ETS.254
The polemic tome that spawned from Nairn and his PIRG‟s investigation, The Reign of
ETS, was a sharp rebuke of ETS‟s impenetrable secrecy and seeming incompetence. Nairn‟s ire
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stemmed from ETS‟s alleged unethical corporate behavior. Nairn charged that the organization
was “‟supposedly a nonprofit enterprise […] operating under the rules of disclosure of a private
company.‟”255 Nairn was also highly critical of the test-prep industry. The report deemed testcoaching as little more than “a respectable form of cheating.”256 For Nairn, the test-prep industry
was at best a parasitic offshoot of the entire standardized testing apparatus.
In May, 1979, the New York State legislature decided to force the standardized testing
industry to operate with transparency by passing truth-in-testing legislation. In mid-June, the
State Senate passed a resolution requiring full disclosure of each student‟s responses on a
standardized exam, as well as the correct answers, no more than thirty days after the particular
exam‟s administration.257 Following the law‟s passage in July, the notion of truth-in-testing
gained federal legislative appeal. Democratic federal Representatives Sam Gibbons and Ted
Weiss both offered bills that would have extended New York State‟s truth-in-testing legislation
nationwide. Weiss‟s bill went so far as to require that standardized test makers‟ scoring and
calculation procedures “be placed in the public domain.”258
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The College Board did not mince words. In the opening editorial for the Fall, 1979,
edition of The College Board Review, Jack Arbolino chided those responsible for New York
State‟s truth-in-testing legislation. The editor remarked:
Laws, like tests, should never promise more than they can deliver. And,
lawmakers might well remember that in the field of education, governmental
regulations are dangerous[; …] well-meaning laypeople and zealous lawmakers
[can] disrupt or cripple an organization.259
With this, Arbolino not only accused champions of truth-in-testing legislation of being ignorant
of what constituted sound educational practices, but also hinted that the Carter administration‟s
creation of the Department of Education was itself a foolhardy endeavor. In turn, The College
Board Review was eager to publish the opinions of those educators who had likewise negative
appraisals of truth-in-testing legislation, including educational historian Diane Ravitch. A known
advocate of the use of the Scholastic Aptitude Tests as part of the college application process,
Ravitch likened truth-in-testing legislation to “consumer fraud” that would unnecessarily
increase testing costs for “student-consumer[s].”260
With this, the test-makers played a game of brinksmanship with New York State.
Claiming that the disclosure of students‟ performances as well as each exam‟s correct answers
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would be cost-prohibitive, several standardized test manufacturers threatened to cease operations
in New York State at the end of the year. Others, such as the ETS, insinuated that New Yorkers
would be subject to stiffer test prices and fewer testing windows as industry transparency would
require consumer sacrifice. (In the 1978-1979 fiscal year, ETS earned $US 94.2 million in
revenues.)261 By the very end of 1979, ETS and the College Board made an about-face. On 29
December, the heads of both companies, along with those of several other testing companies,
released a joint statement indicating their concurrence “that students should be able to examine
the questions and answers on the [SAT] and other examinations.”262 New York high school
students were able to take the SAT and receive full disclosure on their performance, for $14.65, a
fee seventy-seven percent higher than that for test candidates in the rest of the nation.263

Conclusion
Truth-in-testing legislation should have been the death knell of the test-prep industry.
Standardized test makers could have been hobbled to the point of impotence, rendering test-prep
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needless. Indeed, some proponents of testing transparency alleged that New York‟s laws would
cause “tutoring service [to] be less successful in helping students „buy‟ higher scores.”264 In a
sense, it is not surprising that the test-prep magnate Stanley Kaplan would run into the arms of
ETS amidst the torrent of Nader, Nairn, LaValle and other reformists. Despite criticism to the
contrary, Kaplan asserted that he had “witnessed how admissions tests opened doors for
underacheivers, late bloomers, and minorities.”265
In a 1968 essay that discussed the racially discriminatory aspects of standardized testing,
the editors of the Columbia Law Review remarked, “Science operates on the null hypothesis—
that until proved there exists no relation between two variables. […] Furthermore, the law
affirmatively assumes equality.”266 Education, in practice and principle, sits in the intersection of
these two arenas, and thus, any facet of education that is to attain a sense of social acceptability,
including test-prep, had to not run afoul of either scientific or legal criteria. Yet, scientific and
legal burdens of proof do have permeable areas. Something that has not been clearly
scientifically proven is not necessarily disproven, just as something that is not expressly and
overtly permitted by law isn‟t necessarily illegal. It is in these areas—this defaulted
acceptability—where the test-prep industry flourished in the 1960s and 1970s.
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CHAPTER THREE: EVERYBODY INTO THE POOL: THE EXPANSION
OF THE TEST-PREP INDUSTRY, 1980-1989

Witnessing this insolent command, I had to use all my stores of discipline to
quash a surge of antipathy toward him. What a baby. But my mood modulated
as I gauged the hurt look on his face. Was I being insensitive here? […H]e had
enough reasons to resent Luke already. Besides, maybe it was sweet in some way
that he was so jealous over me. Right?267

Peruse any well-stocked chain bookstore, and one will find shelves, or perhaps even an
entire section, devoted to test-prep material. Glossy covers shimmer under fluorescent lighting,
enchanting all those who seek assistance with standardized entrance exams. The companies that
produce such material, Kaplan, Barron‟s, Arco, The Princeton Review, even the College Board,
offer practice tests, strategies, techniques, and drills, often for less than fifty dollars. Some
guarantee improvement, while others provide supplementary information on the college
application process and proper study habits.
Some study aids, such as the above-quoted Head Over Heels, which is part of Spark
Notes‟ line of preparatory material, take a less direct approach to SAT study. The book is
instead meta-referential. The protagonist Francesca falls in love with her classmate Luke as he
helps her prepare for the SAT. Along the way, readers engrossed with Francesca‟s personal and
academic ordeals are also supposed to become better acquainted with vocabulary found on the
SAT. College-level vocabulary is bolded within the text and succinctly defined at the bottom
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margin of each page. At moments, the subtext of the novel is the text itself. One character, a
teacher named Ms. Cloister, states, “‟The most bankable skill you could have in our mediadriven society is to be articulate. […] Which is to say, those who express themselves best get
the best jobs.‟”268 Since this opinion is shrouded in the stentorian musings of a character, the
reader does not feel chided, but rather congratulated for being a diligent student and savvy
consumer.
The publication of texts such as Head Over Heels raises key questions: How did the
American test-prep industry become so prominent? So commonplace? One would be hasty to
claim that the test-prep industry‟s search for legitimacy ended with the developments of the late
1970s. Rather, in order to show how test-prep became accepted as a culturally mainstream
practice, this chapter shall look at the rapid expansion of the industry during the 1980s.
Following the Federal Trade Commission‟s investigation of test-prep companies, as well as the
spread of truth-in-testing legislation beyond New York State, the world of test-prep would
undergo several key alterations. Kaplan, the largest test-prep company, became a subsidiary of
the Washington Post Company and a financial success for both entities. The Princeton Review
quickly became a formidable competitor for Kaplan, and attracted ETS‟s ire in the process. The
industry at-large would expand into emerging media, while new factions, including the College
Board itself, attempted to broaden the market for test-prep.
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By the end of the decade, both the test-prep industry and standardized test manufacturers
were engaged in a cycle of pseudo-antagonism and symbiotic adaptation. Both parties behaved in
ways that, on the surface, should have threatened the vitality and operational integrity of the
other side. Actually, these maneuvers only further guaranteed that test-prep, and logically,
standardized testing, would grow in market size and profits. This pseudo-antagonism between
test-makers and test-coaches relied heavily on the reinvigorated debate on the social value, or in
some eyes, scourge, of the test-prep industry and of standardized testing itself.

The More Things Change…
The Federal Trade Commission‟s tepid findings did not quell the debate between
supporters and opponents of the test-prep industry. Rather, the public academic debate over the
ethical and educational legitimacy of the test-prep industry, as well as the SAT, was reignited
during the early 1980s. This new bandy between psychometricians and their discontents began in
the May, 1980, issue of the Harvard Educational Review, in which Warner Slack and Douglas
Porter delivered a damning criticism of ETS and the SAT. Using meta-analytical statistical
techniques, Slack and Porter alleged that the SAT was indeed coachable, and that ETS‟s claims
to the contrary were reprehensibly damaging to the self-worth of many American youth. Were
the test impervious to coaching, then the notion that the scores from a three-hour exam
“accurately reflected [a student‟s] aptitude” would still be a gross distortion of the test‟s genuine
capabilities as well as a dangerous misuse of the concept of aptitude.269 Even if ETS did not
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believe that one‟s mental aptitude was innate and fixed, the nonprofit did not overtly do anything
to dispel such a belief among the American public.270
Slack and Porter also accused ETS and the College Board of sweeping aside the results of
certain studies “supported in part by [grants] from the College Board” that had demonstrated the
considerably positive effects of coaching on SAT scores.271 In particular, the authors cited J.E.
Marron‟s 1965 study, in which subjects had improved their overall SAT scores by an average of
137 points after several months of coaching. In addition, Slack and Porter discussed Nathaniel
Pallone‟s 1961 study on test coaching, in which the twelfth-graders who participated in the “sixweek, 90-minute-per-day course” improved their SAT-Verbal scores by nearly 100 points.272
Pallone‟s study was instead later used by ETS as a straw man in a subsequent study.273
Such criticism did not sit lightly with ETS head Rex Jackson. In the subsequent issue of
Harvard Educational Review, he dismissed Slack and Porter‟s criticisms as little more than “a
pastiche of familiar charges” premised on specious evidence.274 Jackson noted that Slack and
Porter‟s argument relied on overly extreme definition of aptitude not used by ETS, and that any
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reasonable person should have understood that the SAT did not measure one‟s ultimate mental
capabilities. Slack and Porter countered in the same issue that grasping for nuance with the term
was irrelevant: “[t]he word „aptitude‟ implies „unchanging abilities‟ that are believed to be
„innate.‟”275 Students who had little time or wherewithal to understand the finer semantic
dimensions of “aptitude” would take their respective test scores at face value as clear portraits of
their intellectual limits. Based on this skewed portrayal, students would then spend their adult
lives perceptually bound by these artificial constraints on their capabilities.
Rex Jackson was not the only ETS figure to challenge Slack and Porter‟s claims during
the early 1980‟s. Samuel Messick and Ann Jungeblut‟s article for the March, 1981, edition of
Psychological Bulletin attempted to discredit those studies cited in Slack and Porter‟s defense of
test coaching. According to the psychometricians, any attempt to legitimize test-prep via
previous research was unreasonable because the extant literature “was methodologically flawed
in various and divergent ways.”276 Most studies that validated test-coaching either lacked control
groups or relied upon unscientifically-constructed control groups. More importantly, the results
of most studies on test-prep were truly inconclusive because interested parties refused to set
parameters on what exactly constituted test-coaching. As Messick and Jungeblut argued, the
studies by Marron, Pallone, and others that upheld test-coaching relied on instructional practices
so extensive as to be often interchangeable with actual classroom instruction, and as such, would
be without any merit were students provided with a rigorous high school education.277
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This academic fascination with the future of standardized testing, and by extension, testprep, continued when the periodical American Psychologist devoted its October, 1981, edition to
the subject. The guest editors for the issue were convinced that continued public discourse over
standardized testing “[would] have lasting benefits” for American society.278 Psychologist Anne
Anastasi contributed an article on test-coaching to the issue. Anastasi reaffirmed that test-prep
had become an irrefutably vague concept, and that the confusion found in debates over test-prep
was correspondent to the “pseudodistinctions” made by the American public about the many
standardized tests used for educational and employment purposes.279 In turn, Anastasi insinuated
that the College Board‟s recurrent disdain for the test-prep industry had a more refined logic in
the advent of truth-in-testing legislation. Despite the College Board‟s aim to diminish students‟
test-wiseness by publishing its own line of preparatory material (discussed below), public
schools and private enterprises that offered test-prep services only helped “reintroduce the very
individual differences in narrowly defined test-taking skills.”280 That is, those who championed
test-coaching as a way to combat the alleged unfairness of standardized testing were now causing
inequity in the newly-transparent testing environment.
Unconvinced of the College Board‟s transformation, Slack and Porter again confronted
the creators of the SAT in a 1982 New York Times-organized roundtable discussion. The editorial
panel resolved little. Although Slack badgered College Board President George Hanford into
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stating that the SAT was not designed to measure or suggest one‟s innate mental faculties,
disagreements over the test‟s alleged cultural bias and predictive capabilities remained unsettled.
Further, Hanford refused to define coaching any further than “drill in a short period of time,”
even after Slack accused the College Board of “fraud in science” by selectively publicizing
studies which purported that test-prep produced negligible gains.281 Like ETS‟s Rex Jackson two
years prior, Hanford insisted that any studies with findings to the contrary had serious
methodological flaws.
Amidst this academic back-and-forth, the United States Department of Education began
to challenge the curricular trend toward teaching for specific tests. In a 1982 booklet for the
federal department‟s National Institute of Education, Nancy Borkow sought to challenge the
educational policy direction of “modifying [school] curriculums to emphasize the basics” for the
sake of raising standardized test scores.282 The protracted decline of SAT scores, as well as those
of other aptitude and achievement tests, spurred many American secondary schools and school
systems to reformat their curricula. Reading and mathematics had taken precedence over other
subjects, which were themselves reoriented toward reading and mathematics instruction, e.g.,
reading-through-science and reading-through-history. Borkow noted that average SAT scores for
male and female test-takers in both subjects continued to decline in the 1980s, several years after
the educational reemphasis on basics began. Although the average SAT scores for 1981 “[had]
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remained stable with the 1980 results,” it was unclear at the time of publication whether the trend
had reached a genuine nadir or merely stalled.283
Borkow maintained that this test-based curricular shift would create “a too-narrow focus
on basics” in American secondary education.284 As high schools sought to ensure that all
students grasped rudimentary mathematical and verbal concepts, fewer students became able to
exhibit mastery at more advanced levels; American high school students were stuck at the lower
orders of intellectual engagement. In turn, Borkow forecasted a dire irony for children introduced
to basics-based education in primary school. Although children would benefit from mastering
rudimentary concepts in primary schooling, the back-to-basics focus in secondary schools would
deny these students the opportunity to study advanced concepts later in their requisite education,
thus “render[ing] the high school diploma essentially valueless.”285
Unsurprisingly, ETS concurred with Barkow‟s assessment; Donald Powers and Donald
Alderman‟s 1983 study for the Journal of Educational Measurement concluded that attempts to
perform better on the SAT through familiarization with the test‟s structure were fruitless. The
authors maintained that the “test familiarization booklet […] Taking the SAT,” which had been
distributed to SAT candidates since late 1978, produced no substantial increase in scores.286
Despite including “a full-length sample test and answers to questions,” the booklet only had a
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slightly positive influence on mathematics scores.287 Rather, the only improvement of genuine
statistical significance was students‟ level of confidence. The message was clear. If clear and
thorough familiarization with the SAT made students feel more comfortable without leading to
significant increases in scores, then the test was well-written and the test-makers were behaving
fairly. Therefore, coaching was a sham. 288
On the surface, the continued debate over test-prep, its parameters, and its usefulness
ought to have hobbled the industry. The incredibly broad spectrum of practices that researchers,
psychometricians, critics, and entrepreneurs regarded as SAT-coaching should have bred
widespread consumer distrust. Instead, this vagueness and lack of consensus kept the industry
afloat. If those parties with a vested interest in test-coaching could not concur on what it
constituted, even in a broad sense, then claims that the industry profited from illegitimate
practices were difficult to sustain. Rather, what remained sustained was the principle of
legitimacy by default. Test-prep entrepreneurs could market their goods and engage in practices
so long as they were not blatantly illegal. However, as will be seen with the actions of John
Katzman and The Princeton Review, some test-prep enterprises purposely operated in the
hinterlands of ethicality and legality in the 1980s, and became highly-profitable from doing so.
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John Katzman, Clever Advertising, and the Limits of Copyright
The test-prep industry‟s acquisition of legitimacy during the 1980s also depended upon
the development of formidable competition. During this decade, more test-prep companies
gained national notoriety, and none more so than The Princeton Review (“TPR”). Founded in
New York City in 1981 by John Katzman, The Princeton Review held an openly antipathetic
view toward the SAT: one‟s results reflected nothing except one‟s ability to take that particular
exam.289 But, for “between $500 and $600,” students could learn from TPR how to outwit the
structure of the SAT in order to attain a higher score.290 Both Katzman and his associate Adam
Robinson had experience in the test-prep industry prior to The Princeton Review. Katzman had
worked at Bob Scheller‟s test-coaching school, the content of which having been developed by
Robinson.291
Glibly cynical, The Princeton Review‟s advertisements had a tenor and rhetoric starkly
different than those of other test-prep companies. This style was noticeable even in TPR‟s
earliest ads. One such ad, printed in the New York Times in August and September of 1981,
sought to hook readers with the remark: “Some people have an Uncle on the Admissions
Board…and some people have The Princeton Review.”292 While the ad copy was quick to note
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that TPR classes were taught “by a staff of Ivy League alumni and undergraduates” using the
latest in computer technology, it was mum on how much the eight-week SAT-prep course
actually cost.293 Despite having the money to pay for boutique test coaching, and the luck to live
in the greater New York City metropolitan area, students and parents were subtextually
complimented in these ads for not being from an older order of established money and power.
The nouveau riche and stridently bourgeois still had to earn their respective slots on admissions
lists.294
The Princeton Review‟s advertisements were also openly critical of its competition,
particularly Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Centers. A series of TPR ads printed in 1985
triumphantly declared “WE SCORE MORE!”295 This exclamation was set below a slanted bar
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graph that showed the alleged improvement in students‟ SAT scores after various methods of
coaching and preparation. Kaplan‟s bar for 50 points of improvement was dwarfed by the bar for
The Princeton Review‟s 150, which expanded beyond the graph frame itself. Indeed, parents in
Greater Metropolitan New York, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, and Atlanta were promised a
“repeat [of a TPR] course at no additional cost” if their children could not improve their SAT
scores by at least 120 points.296
A later ad for The Princeton Review in the 24 August, 1988, edition of the Wall Street
Journal, was less cordial toward Kaplan. In bolded, all-capitalized, sans-serif font, the hook of
the double-column ad quipped, “If You Can‟t Afford The Princeton Review, Stanley Kaplan Is
An Acceptable Compromise.”297 The ad copy wryly mocked those who purchased an inferior,
understaffed, and outdated Kaplan SAT prep course for the sake of frugality. The company‟s
logo, a thick upward arrow, was paired with the slogan “The nemesis of standardized testing.”298
Hence, the ad generated appeal by signaling to the reader that The Princeton Review stood in
direct opposition to not only its competition, namely Kaplan, but also the testing industry itself.
Another ad for The Princeton Review, placed in the 25 February, 1988, edition of the
Wall Street Journal‟s “Leisure & Arts” section, employed several clever techniques at once. The
ad‟s hook, “Not everyone tests well,” was placed above a series of six comically drawn figures,
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which were meant to illustrate the evolution from chimp to modern man.299 Each of these six
figures was sequentially labeled “Week 1” to “Week 6,” suggesting that TPR could help any
student become a “highly evolved” test-taker. Furthermore, the ad‟s copy included snippet
endorsements from both Rolling Stone and The Christian Science Monitor, perhaps in an attempt
to lend credibility while playing to the sensibilities of both youth and parents.
However, the testimonial in this advertisement attributed to Rolling Stone was somewhat
misleading. The blurb stated:
Rolling Stone reports, “Princeton Review Students are being admitted to college
that wouldn‟t have considered them before…When you raise a kid‟s score 200 or
300 points, …you change his whole outlook about himself.”300
While these phrases are attributable to an article for the 28 March, 1985, issue for Rolling Stone,
the second sentence was not written by the piece‟s author, David Owen. Rather, this portion of
the blurb was from a quote by Katzman himself as the second ellipses in this blurb simply erased
“he says” from Owen‟s writing.301 Given Owen‟s highly positive portrayal of The Princeton
Review, the company need not have resorted to specious quotations.
Further complicating Katzman‟s clever manipulation of his company‟s notoriety was the
widespread success of his book Cracking the SAT. The 1986 bestseller was praised by

299

Display Ad, Wall Street Journal, February 23, 1988: 10; microfilm.

300

Ibid. See also: Educational Testing Service v. John Katzman and The Princeton Review, 631 F. Supp.
550 (1986) 551, note 1; available via LexisNexis Academic,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/ (last accessed February 15, 2011). Judge
Maryanne Trump Barry noted that another advertisement for The Princeton Review may have given the false
impression that the company, and not Katzman‘s work experience in the test prep industry, had dated back to 1977.
301

Display Ad, Wall Street Journal, February 23, 1988: 10; microfilm. See also, Owen, ―Adam and John
say put your pencil down,‖ 80. Owen‘s fondness for The Princeton Review has been discussed elsewhere; see:
Gerald W. Bracey, ―Review: ETS as Big Brother: An Essay-Review,‖ Phi Delta Kappan 67, no. 1 (September
1985): 75-79; http://www.jstor.org/stable/20387537 (last accessed March 12, 2011).

115

editorialists for “exposing the gimmicks and flaws of [… the] SAT.”302 For ten dollars, any
student could learn how to manipulate the mechanics and structure of the SAT to their own
benefit. By the mid-1980s, Katzman was not a businessman in the fringes of the test-prep
industry, but rather a quickly-ascendant figure who would use relatively controversial behavior
to his company‟s advantage.
However, Katzman‟s braggadocio and business practices occasionally crossed into
unethical and illegal behavior, leading to a series of lawsuits and appeals between Katzman and
Educational Testing Service during the mid-1980s. The findings in these cases further
entrenched the test-prep industry in a cat-and-mouse game with standardized test manufacturers
over the legality of certain business practices. These legal actions began in August, 1985, when
ETS filed a civil action against both Katzman and The Princeton Review in the United States
District Court for New Jersey. ETS wanted to forbid the test-prep company from using several
hundred “confidential test questions” allegedly pilfered by Katzman and his employees for TPR
clients.303 Katzman and TPR were believed to have coached their clientele with “facsimile”
versions of SAT-Math, SAT-Verbal, and other College Board test questions, causing nearly 300
“secure” test questions slated for use in the 1985 versions of the SAT to be discontinued.304 As
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noted by Judge Clarkson Fisher in his opinion for Educational Testing Service v. John Katzman
and The Princeton Review, Inc., this theft likely constituted not only a violation of copyright law
but also an “irreparable injury” to the integrity of ETS‟s standardized exams.305 Fisher found in
ETS‟s favor, and granted a preliminary injunction in August, 1985.
However, the case summary for the preliminary injunction, as well as those for the formal
injunction and its appeal, indicates that ETS had previously sought to settle with Katzman for his
theft of this test material. In 1982, while The Princeton Review was a sole proprietorship,
Katzman came under the possession of “certain Math and English Composition Achievement
Tests,” and distributed material from these exams to his clientele prior to their official use by
ETS.306 Katzman refused to reveal how he attained the material, but reached an accord with ETS
the next year with the following terms:
to return all copies of the purloined tests, to refrain from copying or distributing
any ETS copyrighted or copyrightable materials or registering for or attending
any test administered by ETS unless it was for bona fide purposes, and to notify
ETS if any unlawfully obtained ETS tests came into [his] possession and provide
ETS with information as to their source.307
When this stolen material resurfaced in TPR‟s preparatory material two years later, ETS sought
an enjoined injunction. Educational Testing Service supplemented its accusation of betrayal by
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documenting the various occasions after the agreement in which Katzman had registered to take
the SAT himself, as well as attempted to order ETS materials.308
Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, also of the District Court of New Jersey, re-approached
the lawsuit the following spring. She had to discern if ETS‟s pursuit of an injunction against
Katzman, his company, and his associates was valid based on the grounds of territoriality and
corporate accountability. That is, Barry needed to decide whether Katzman‟s actions made him
prone to New Jersey law despite being a New York resident, and whether Katzman was
responsible for The Princeton Review‟s actions following the company‟s incorporation in 1984.
The judge deduced that “Katzman [was] amenable to suit in New Jersey,” and that his 1983
arrangement with ETS was a valid precedent to establish his contacts in the state, despite its
correlative relationship to the case at hand.309 Katzman‟s counterclaims were largely denied, and
ETS‟s injunction was upheld.
The case was subsequently brought to the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Judge Dolores Sloviter, writing on behalf of the appellate court, upheld the notion that
Katzman‟s actions were unjustifiable, regardless of the alleged misdeeds of ETS. Indeed,
Sloviter regarded any educational benefits of The Princeton Review as far too minimal to
consider the copyright breach as fair use on academic grounds.310 Yet, Sloviter declared that a
large portion of the injunction was too broad. Given that the prohibition of “‟adapting‟ ETS‟
materials may [have encompassed] permissible use of ETS‟ material,” Katzman and TPR were
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unduly prevented by the injunction from potential legitimate business practices.311 Amendments
aside, the injunction held, and Katzman and his company were still amenable to trial for
copyright infringement.
According to Zena Woldeyesus, the Third Circuit‟s ruling against Katzman and The
Princeton Review set a dangerous precedent for the standards of fair market practices.
Woldeyesus notes that as for-profit enterprises, The Princeton Review and other “similar indirect
competitors” were seen as unfair threats to ETS‟s non-profit operations.312 Yet, ETS‟s non-profit
designation was itself flimsy, as it was more realistically a quasi-monopolistic enterprise with
for-profit subsidiaries. Hence, litigious measures taken by a non-profit such as ETS against
indirect competition could help shield the non-profit from public scrutiny of its own practices.
Further, Woldeyesus maintains that the Third Circuit‟s decision on the “facsimile”
versions of SAT questions set up a slippery standard for intellectual property law. More
specifically, the extension of a copyright from a compilation to “the individual material within
th[at] compilation,” particularly when the individual questions tested common knowledge and
largely lacked the element of originality and creative effort necessary to gain copyrights on their
own merit, gave unnecessary power to those with the monetary means to defend the breadth of
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their copyrights.313 The Third Circuit‟s decision allowed ETS (and, in turn, whatever party with
enough money) to copyright algebraic concepts, grammar principles, and other utterances that
were seemingly guaranteed to be outside the scope of copyright.314
The convoluted nature of ETS‟s legal battle with Katzman and TPR exposed the
necessary element of artifice within the test-prep industry. Following Woldeyesus‟s logic, the
material found on the SAT was largely within the realm of common knowledge and largely
outside the realm of individual-item copyright, and thus only had the element of originality when
viewed in its entirety.315 Conversely, following the Third Circuit‟s logic, the common
knowledge or factual material tested by standardized exams did not negate the copyrightable
nature of the question forms or language used to ask questions. That is, standardized test
questions may have been copyrightable for how they asked rather than what they asked, and thus
did not run afoul of “the principle of merger between the idea and expression.”316 In either
instance, the legal and business legitimacy of test-prep companies could not rest in their
preparatory material‟s verisimilitude to standardized test material. Instead, the packaging of their
preparatory material was most important.
The Princeton Review and Kaztman‟s actions demonstrated that the legitimacy of the
test-prep industry during the 1980s hinged upon companies displaying distinguishable attitudes
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toward the SAT and standardized testing in general. Unlike Kaplan‟s largely positive appraisal of
the SAT, The Princeton Review publicly held it in contempt, so much so that Katzman would
later liken the exam to “a cancer.”317 Indeed, Katzman claimed that his legal defeat was actually
a victory as the two years and hundreds of thousands of dollars ETS invested in its lawsuit only
led to a reward of “$52,000 in damages” and massive growth in The Princeton Review‟s
business.318 Taken at face value, Katzman‟s statements were absurd. Only the most foolish or
zealous businessmen would want to destroy the industry on which their enterprise was based.
However, publicly sharing a disdain for the exam with one‟s key demographic was shrewd, as
allowing clients to believe that their choice in test-prep was genuinely different would create
handsome profits for Katzman and his company.

Association, Acquisition, and the Money Game
The previous chapter showed that the test-prep industry did not always acquire legitimacy
through its own direct actions during the 1960s and 1970s. However, in the 1980s, certain test-
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prep companies gained legitimacy through their association with and acquisition by other noneducational corporations. In November, 1984, the Washington Post Company entered into an
“agreement in principle” to purchase Kaplan.319 In exchange for Kaplan, Inc. becoming a
subsidiary of the media company, Stanley Kaplan would retain his position as CEO for an
additional 10 years following the purchase. Richard D. Simmons, who was the president of
Washington Post Company at the time, indicated a desire to broaden Kaplan‟s scope and reach.
Simmons was eager to bring Kaplan to overseas markets as well as expand its domestic clientele,
particularly for SAT prep. Despite the $35 million Kaplan earned from its preparatory services in
1984, the company had reached “only a small percentage” of high school students who took the
SAT in the previous year.320
In the company‟s initial several years as a subsidiary, Kaplan remained a relatively minor
entity, especially in comparison to Washington Post Company‟s flagship newspaper and
Newsweek magazine. During the 1980‟s, Kaplan was categorized as part of Washington Post
Company‟s “Other Businesses,” which included “a database publisher[ ]and cellular telephone
operations in Miami.”321 These motley holdings provided only six percent of Washington Post
Company‟s revenues in 1987. In the same fiscal year, these companies generated roughly US
$8.56 million in revenues. While this was a considerable improvement from the roughly US
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$919,000 in losses in 1986, this figure was a mere three percent of Washington Post Company‟s
income that year.322
However, the Washington Post Company‟s annual reports to stockholders during the late
1980s illustrate how profitable the newspaper magnate and the test-prep company would become
for each other. Between the time of its acquisition and the end of the decade, Kaplan‟s revenues
“ha[d] increased nearly [eighty] percent.”323 Corollary, the company‟s clientele base grew under
the supervision of Washington Post Company. In 1987 alone, Kaplan had over 100,000
customers, a figure that increased by twenty percent in the following two years.
Kaplan also expanded its physical presence under the auspices of Washington Post
Company. The company opened centers “in Stamford, Connecticut; Lawrence, Kansas;
Bethesda, Maryland; and Grand Rapids, Michigan” in 1987.324 The following year, four more
permanent offices were opened “in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania[;] Norfolk, Virginia[;] and Boca
Raton and Jacksonville, Florida.”325 By the end of the 1980s, Kaplan operated in 137 locations,
having expanded to “Monmouth County and Cherry Hill, New Jersey; Lincoln, Nebraska;
Spokane, Washington; and Colorado Springs, Colorado.”326 Kaplan and in turn, the test-prep
industry, was no longer confined to major metropolitan areas of the country as Kaplan was
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spreading into commuting communities and secondary cities across the country. The industry
was more legitimate because its premium goods were no longer foreign or unattainable to those
outside of major urban areas.
When discussing the physical spread of the test-prep industry during the 1980s, it may
also be useful to consider how American income levels changed throughout the decade. In 1980,
the median American household income was $17,710, roughly double of what it had been
($8,734) ten years prior; mean American household income levels also increased in a similarly
proportional manner.327 However, the rate of inflation was so steady during the 1970s that
Americans possessed less purchasing power in the early 1980s than at any time in the previous
decade.328 That said, the rate of inflation affected different families in different fashions.
Nonwhites continued to earn drastically less money than their white counterparts. In 1978, the
median income for white households was $15,660, whereas African-American households had a
median income of $9,411. By 1982, that gap had increased as white households had a median
income of $21,117, while African-American households had a median income of $11,968.329
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The difference in income levels based on educational attainment was equally stark. While
the average high school dropout earned $17,469 in 1983 (down from $17,517 the year prior), the
typical high school graduate earned $24,506. Meanwhile, college graduates had a median income
of $37,467—over fifty percent greater than that for high school graduates. This figure was a
considerable increase from their median income of $35,778 in 1982. However, a baccalaureate
degree itself was not the sole educational means for Americans to receive a higher income;
Americans who had attended college but did not receive a four-year degree had an average
income of $29,097 in 1983.330 That same year, the income-gap between those who had a high
school diploma and those who had attended, but did not graduate from, university widened to
$4,591, up from $3,606 the year prior.331
Such discrepancies continued throughout the rest of the 1980s. In 1987 American
households headed by a high-school graduate had a median income of $25,190, which was
nearly $800 lower than the median income for all American households that year. Meanwhile,
those households headed by an individual with some undergraduate college education had a
median income of $30,435. (Households led by a college graduate had a median income of
$43,073.)332 This income gap between those with some college and those without any college
330
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was present even when accounting for race and ethnicity. White and Hispanic households headed
by those with one to three years of college education head median income levels roughly 18.6
percent higher in 1987 than their respective counterpart households led by individuals with only
a high school diploma. For African-American households that year, the difference was nearly
23.4 percent.333 This gap also remained considerable when factored by gender. Between 1987
and 1989, male “year-round, full-time workers” with some undergraduate college education
earned at least 15.8 percent more than those with only a full high school education.334 The
difference was at least 19.8 percent when accounting for all males in the workforce. For females,
the minimum gaps in the same period were 20.5 percent for full-time workers, and 36.4 percent
for the female workforce in general.
At the end of the 1980s, over 15.8 million American households were led by individuals
with some undergraduate education. Although more American households were headed by
individuals with high school diplomas alone (over 31.2 million) or baccalaureate degrees
(roughly 20.4 million), this demographic group was a sizeable component of all American

Money Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the United States: 1988 and 1989 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1991), 14.
333

U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, ―Table 4: Summary Measures of Characteristics and
Income in 1987—Selected Characteristics of Households, by Race and Hispanic Origin of Householder,‖ Current
Population Reports, Series P-60, no. 162: Money Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the United
States: 1987 (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 1989): 17, 19, 21. The roughly 28.6 million white
households in 1987 led by individuals with only high school diplomas had a median income of $30,065, whereas the
roughly 13.5 million white households that year led by individuals with one to three years of college education had a
median income of $35,646. For Hispanic families in 1987, the breakdown of median incomes was: $26,443 for the
roughly 1.55 million households led by individuals with only high school diplomas, and $31,367 for the 723,000
households led by individuals with one to three years of college education. For African-American families in 1987:
$21,139 for the roughly 3.56 million households led by individuals with only high school diplomas, and $26,078 for
the roughly 1.56 million households led by individuals with one to three years of college education.
334

U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, ―Table 24: Median Income of Persons, by Selected
Characteristics: 1989, 1988, and 1987,‖ Current Population Reports: Series P-60, no. 172, Money Income of
Households, Families, and Persons in the United States: 1988 and 1989 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1991): 102, 100-103.

126

households.335 The presence of an income gap between high school graduates and college
attendants, coupled with growth of major test-prep enterprises outside of primary urban areas,
may have reinforced the pragmatic uses of both the SAT and the test-prep industry. If one was
more likely to make more money by completing some college, and if one‟s opportunity to attend
college was greater than ever, then the burden of a degree itself may have been lessened.
Simultaneously, prep was more available than before, in an increasingly broader price range
albeit of varying quality. A 1984 report by the New York State Consumer Protection Board
revealed that the courses run by test-prep companies operating within the state had “tuitions
[ranging from] $35 to $1,008.”336 In a sense, the primary wage concern for the broader pool of
SAT candidates was no longer even getting a degree from the college or university that was the
best fit for them. It was merely getting some college, any college, under their belt. Test-prep of
any type could be a relatively inexpensive means to this end.

Playing the Fool
The expansion of the test-prep industry was further complicated by the College Board‟s
decision to produce its own line of test-prep materials in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The
original version of the College Board‟s preparatory material, 4 SATs, was a direct consequence
of truth-in-testing legislation. The popularity of this publication led to more extensive editions,
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leading to the commercially-sold publication 10 SATs in 1983.337 “[F]or about $9,” a student
could acquaint himself with the SAT through previously-used versions of the exam.338 As David
Owen implied in an article on test-prep material, most SAT guides and tutorials on the market at
that time were evidently ill-suited for preparing students for the actual exam. Many guides, such
as those produced by Gruber and Arco, either mangled the logical structure of question types or
contained “bizarrely superfluous” vocabulary lists and reference guides with little relevance to
the SAT itself.339
The College Board‟s decision to release previously-used SATs may be seen as the
organization‟s successful attempt to remain viable after truth-in-testing legislation had forced the
standardized testing industry to operate with unprecedented transparency. In turn, the decision to
commercially publish obsolete material allowed the College Board to maintain the appearance
that truth-in-testing legislation would not hobble the quantity or quality of its testing content. The
implication was clear. The College Board could dispose of old tests because it would always be
able to outmaneuver its indirect competition. At the very least, ETS and the College Board
always had the option of altering the structure and content of the exam if the material was found
to be too trainable.
However, to be surprised that the publication of actual SATs by its own creators did not
hobble the test-prep industry is to ignore the complicated relationship between those who make
the test and those who coach for the test. The publication 10 SATs could only prompt test-prep
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companies to align their preparatory material more closely with that which was actually tested on
the SAT in order to remain credible. One could also argue that the affordability of The Princeton
Review‟s Cracking the SAT stemmed partially from the low price of the College Board‟s own
publication. Further, if ETS and the College Board still retained the right to revise the structure
and content of the SAT, then the test-prep companies may have served as trustworthy, or at least
tolerated, guides through the evolution of the exam. Meanwhile, the injunction against Katzman
and TPR kept an undefined check on test-prep companies from adapting material too-close in
resemblance to the College Board‟s published material.
Given the continued decline of SAT scores following New York State‟s truth-in-testing
legislation, the College Board also may have well understood that the aggregate national SAT
scores for students were not vulnerable to coaching, and that the market pressures as well as
debates over pedagogical theory would prevent test-prep from ever truly making a severe impact
on national SAT score trends. The College Board adhered to this mindset even when SAT scores
finally began to improve. In 1982, national average SAT scores rose for the “first time in 19
years,” up three points from the previous year‟s figures.340 The average combined math and
verbal scores for American students had inched up to 893 points, but this figure was eighty-seven
points lower than the national SAT average score for 1963, when students‟ performance levels
on the exam began to erode. The College Board‟s denial of test-prep‟s impact on national SAT
scores may have allowed the organization to better rationalize that their own study guide was
merely a familiarization device and thus had no genuine impact on scores.341
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The College Board‟s ambiguous arrival to the test-prep industry was in sharp contrast to
the National Association of Secondary School Principals‟ blatant entry into the market in 1982.
The nonprofit organization designed their SAT-prep program to be used in the classroom,
integrated within extant curricula. Given that the organization‟s program was intended to be used
over “20 weeks […for] 40 minutes a day,” one could surmise that the NASSP had hoped to
create semester-long courses of SAT-prep strictly designed around their own software.342 In turn,
by creating “not only workbooks and teachers‟ manuals but [also] six videotapes and three
computer programs,” the NASSP sought to cater to schools with varying levels of media.343
Regardless of the version of NASSP-designed SAT-prep that a school administrator decided to
provide to his or her school, “the program would cost about $1500.”344 Several hundred students
could receive long-term SAT coaching at a lesser cost than five students independently enrolling
in a prep course at Kaplan.
The NASSP‟s test-prep ambitions were part of a broader expansion by the industry into
computer media. As seen by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich‟s program Computer S.A.T., the original
test-prep material for the medium was not particularly intuitive, nor entirely computerized.
Consumers of Computer S.A.T. spent $70 (over $150 in 2010 dollars) for a program that offered
little innovation beyond the ability to fill in “the answer blanks [that appeared] on the computer
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screen.”345 By the mid-1980‟s, certain computer-based SAT-prep programs offered greater
customization. Barron‟s software provided students “a comprehensive 10-week program, a twoweek cram session, [and] a two-day panic mode.”346 Nonetheless, early consumers of test-prep
computer software may have been willing to sacrifice preparatory capabilities for convenience
and novelty.
The ability of educational organizations such as the NASSP to sponsor SAT-prep
programs as well as the industry‟s widespread fascination with computer media would have been
far less possible had the College Board been less coy with its intentions for commercially
publishing 10 SATs. If the test-makers were more adamant about the direct preparatory benefits
of using obsolete SATs, then test-prep companies may have been rendered obsolete. Given the
College Board‟s decades-long stance and lingering dubiousness over test-coaching, such an
outcome would have been highly unlikely, and may have tarnished the organization‟s credibility.
Conversely, truth-in-testing legislation compelled test-prep companies to produce preparatory
material with seemingly greater relevance to the actual SAT in order to remain credible and
profitable, or at least to embrace new media in order to deflect criticism. These actions
compelled the College Board to redesign the test whenever necessary. In a sense, both the testmakers and the test-coachers now held genuine leverage against each other. Rather than use such
leverage too forcefully, each side chose to engage symbiotically by the late 1980s, thus
generating maximum profits for all involved.
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Conclusion
During the 1980s, the test-makers and test coaches had to engage with each other in a
rhetoric that was at least nominally antagonistic. To have done otherwise would have jeopardized
the integrity of either side. Despite this façade of competition, standardized test manufacturers
had ensnared themselves in a codependent relationship with the test-prep industry. To this end,
the decisions of the Third Circuit in the ETS v. Katzman cases should not be viewed as dangerous
precedents for copyright law, but rather the means to compel further interdependency between
test-makers and test-coaches. Test-prep companies had to ensure that their coaching material was
distinct enough from the actual SAT as well as competing companies‟ material in order to avoid
copyright infringement. However, the College Board‟s increasingly enigmatic position on testcoaching, reinforced with the commercial publication of obsolete versions of the SAT, gave the
test-prep industry greater leeway in developing methodologies and techniques that could
convince their target audience that test-prep would divine the seemingly ineffable metrics of the
SAT.
With this, it may be argued that the test-prep industry had heretofore relied on potential.
That is, the threat that test-prep had posed to standardized testing during the 1960s and 1970s
had been little more than the potential havoc that test coaching may have had on the SAT and
other facets of psychometry. Until the early 1980s, test-prep had not been available to enough
students in enough capacities that acquisition of a test-prep company seemed like a sound
business venture, particularly for corporations with little, if any, connection to standardized
testing or education.
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While one must acknowledge Nairn‟s argument that standardized testing, and by
extension test-prep, reinforced and broadened socioeconomic gaps, one must also acknowledge
that the test-prep industry had broadened to such a point in the 1980s that test-prep was available
to different socioeconomic groups. More fairly, Nairn‟s analysis did not portend the
unwillingness for any party to define what test-prep truly entailed. Instead, it may be more
reasonable to surmise that a broad spectrum of preparatory material was available for a wide
array of price points, and the truly socioeconomically discriminatory element to this was
business was the alleged quality and thoroughness of the preparatory material certain audiences
could afford,
If Alderman and Power‟s 1983 study lends any insight into ETS‟s opinion about test
coaching, then it does show the nonprofit‟s stance was quite simple: test coaching, regardless of
who supplies it, does not genuinely improve scores. Given the rulings in ETS v. Katzman, the
threat of test-prep to standardized testing‟s integrity was no longer based on how well a student
improved on a standardized exam, but rather the preparatory material‟s degree of similarity to
ETS‟s own copyrighted material. So long as test-prep materials, courses, books, and computer
programs did not cross the threshold of copyright infringement, ETS would not genuinely care
about said coaching‟s efficacy.
In short: by the early 1980‟s, ETS realized that while it could not eliminate “[t]he $60million-a-year test-aid industry,” it could keep a leash on the industry‟s public perception.347 If
ETS and the College Board willingly gave candidates practice material for the SAT, then it came
with both implicit and reported messages that such measures did not affect the integrity of the
347
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exam; consumers could get the perception than any such prep was a waste of time. Those who
could only afford prep books or other relatively inexpensive forms of test-prep could more easily
disregard The Princeton Review, Kaplan, and other prep companies as a waste of money. Why
spend hundreds of dollars being pampered and coddled through one‟s SAT prep when several
dollars‟ worth of self-directed practice with a book would suffice? Meanwhile, those who could
afford more expensive versions of test-prep could believe their purchases were more genuine.
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CONCLUSION: FINAL REMARKS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH

Invariably, a historical essay must reckon with its audience a greater point. It must give a
suitable answer to “So?” Hopefully, this essay has clearly addressed the more narrow lines of
relevance. The test-prep industry found acceptability by burrowing into the intersection of
business and education. Certain test-prep companies brokered legitimacy through the rhetorical
devices in their advertising. The legitimacy for the industry at-large was gained by default as
neither the American government nor the American public could conclusively demonstrate that
the industry conducted wholesale fraud. The standardized test manufacturers were forced to
engage in a cat-and-mouse game of pseudo-antagonism and adaptation with the test-prep
industry once truth-in-testing laws prescribed transparent operations in standardized testing.
Such developments affect the current state of American standardized testing, its fluctuating but
ubiquitous presence in the college admissions process, and the perpetuation of the test-prep
industry decades after its origins.
Ideally, broader links of relevance have also been shown through this research. Most
simply: when we acknowledge the intersections of business and education, we are better able to
understand how the notion of a “proper education” is created, and in turn, how we relate
education to the broader pursuit of a “proper” life. When practices that were once considered
unacceptable such as paying for coaching on standardized admission exams become routine, it is
crucial to apply historical scrutiny: “How” and “why did this happen?” The downside to living in

135

a highly ahistorical society is the tendency for Americans to believe that what is today has
always been. Lesko‟s argument on the naturalization of adolescence can be applied to
contemporary American culture and society at large.348
Obviously, the research conducted for this thesis can be drawn upon for further, better
historical work on the test-prep industry. Other scholars might wish to explore this topic along
different lines. Most glaringly, this thesis largely sidesteps the relationship between standardized
testing and civil rights in American education during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. While this
decision was largely in deference research already conducted and squarely focused on this topic,
future research must address the relationship of race and the test-prep industry more forthrightly.
Another suitable avenue may involve determining the industry's place in the broader field of
proprietary and extracurricular education. Future research may include analysis of the roles and
structures of earlier private instructional and educational businesses, and if they influenced how
test-prep enterprises later developed. More broadly, future researchers may want to incorporate
the history of the test-prep industry more fully into the history of the informal sector of American
education.
This topic may be better suited for the field of urban history. In particular, urban
historians may wish to explore the relationship between American suburbanization and the
spread of test-prep enterprises throughout the country. Historians of New York City may find it
worthwhile to trace the spread of test-prep companies throughout the boroughs and broader
metropolitan area in order to determine how the industry grew within the city. Corollary to this,
sociologists and cultural anthropologists who have a fascination with New York City may
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consider tracing the relationship between neighborhoods‟ socioeconomic levels and the
preponderance of test-prep proprietorships, public schools, and private schools within each
respective neighborhood. Such a project could also be reasonable for those urban areas with a
long history of test-prep or college preparatory enterprises.
Clearly, this topic would benefit from the work of those historians with expertise in the
history of advertising and print media, particularly with small- to mid-circulation newspapers. A
great deal of the research conducted for this essay would not have been possible had it not been
for the work of those individuals determined to digitize and digitally archive mid-century
newspapers--including advertisements. Once the archives of American mid-century publications
are more fully digitized, future researchers can determine when the test-prep industry appeared in
certain American communities, how these businesses advertised, if competition was quick or
slow to develop, and whether companies employed novel advertising techniques, imagery, or
rhetoric.

Hopefully, this thesis has demonstrated that the test-prep industry is more than a bizarre
side note in the broader story of American education. Rather, it could be said that the practices of
test-prep companies have served as the seam between approaches to American education during
the twentieth century and those of the past decade. To this end, the test-prep industry is now
legitimate because it is inextricable. These companies are too entwined in the daily flow of
American education to be excised without considerable consequence to the contemporary
structure of education in this country.
With this, to portray the test-prep industry writ large as the means for relatively affluent
youth to secure entry into acclaimed postsecondary institutions and, thus, secure their lifestyle
and socioeconomic power is to personify the actions of the entire industry by those of a select
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number of businesses. Yes, the longevity of the industry has depended upon a consumer base
with discretionary income even in the case of relatively inexpensive trade paperback study
guides, as well as a social climate that regards postsecondary education as an increasingly
indispensable milestone in contemporary life. However, the sustainability of the industry,
regardless of various entities' business strategies or operating mantras, has been rooted in the
understanding that standardized testing and entrance examinations have a limit to their
quantitative and psychometric capabilities, and that standardized testing is itself too entrenched
in contemporary American education to be winnowed away in any substantial fashion during the
near future. As long as concerns about the ethicality, comprehensiveness, and applications of
standardized testing are addressed by working within educational structures dependant upon
standardized testing and entrance exams, the test-prep industry (and its many offspring) will
continue to thrive.
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APPENDIX: THE COURSE OF THE TEST-PREP INDUSTRY, 1990-2010
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Of course, the test-prep industry did not suddenly stop evolving at the end of the 1980s.
To that end, the timeline of this thesis may seem somewhat arbitrary. Why not end the story in
1992, or 1999, or 2010? Hopefully, what has become apparent throughout this essay is that,
between the late 1940s and late 1980s, the test-prep industry at-large acquired and generated
enough legitimacy to ensure that future actions of individual enterprises would not jeopardize the
stability of the entire industry. Nonetheless, the industry at-large did exhibit certain trends and
undergo several changes in the past two decades.
The cycle of pseudo-antagonism and symbiotic adaptation between standardized test
manufacturers and test-prep companies continued well into the 1990s and new century.
Following another decline in national average composite SAT scores in 1991, the College Board
and ETS made considerable alterations to the SAT in the mid-1990s. Beginning in 1994, testtakers were granted the use of calculators, and were provided a set of questions for which they
had to “figure out the answer instead of having [a] list of options.”349 A decade later, the testmakers incorporated a mandatory essay as part of a new writing and grammar component to the
exam.350 Despite claims to the contrary by various test-prep companies, the College Board
asserted that these revisions to the SAT made the exam considerably less coachable. In turn, both
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ETS and the College Board continued to publish research that alleged the relative inefficacy of
SAT prep courses.351
Yet, many test-prep companies were not fearful of these alterations, per se. John
Katzman, who openly mocked the new SAT essay as an exercise in “earnest, long-winded, and
predictable” writing, was not concerned with structural changes to the SATs so much as the
continued heavy use of major standardized entrance exams in the American educational
system.352 This sentiment can be found in TPR‟s 2000 S-1 filing for the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in which the company announced its intentions to publicly trade a portion of its
common stock through NASDAQ. Detailing the many ways that investing with The Princeton
Review could be a hazard for potential shareholders, the report cautions that, “[i]f the use of
standardized tests declines or falls out of favor with educational institutions or state and local
governments,” then The Princeton Review may be rendered a relatively baseless enterprise.353
However, the S-1 report does not indicate a fear over actual changes to the SAT, ACT, or other
tests. TPR assumed any version of these exams would be flawed enough to be trainable to its
clientele, and thus, remain profitable for the company.
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However, The Princeton Review‟s S-1 report, along with the Washington Post
Company‟s SEC filings from the same time period, show that certain test-prep enterprises had
intentions of encroaching upon other educational pursuits. By 1999, TPR had expanded into
“high-end college admissions counseling” through its branch Princeton Review 121, as well as
“academic assessment, remediation, and enrichment services to children in grades three through
eight” through its subscription-based website Homeroom.com.354 Meanwhile, Kaplan segued
into providing higher education itself by founding Concord University School of Law in 1998.
Customers could now attend “the nation‟s first school [to offer] a juris doctor degree earned
wholly online.”355 Two years later, Kaplan acquired Quest Education Corporation. By
purchasing an already-accredited network of post-secondary institutions, Kaplan could grant
degrees in “healthcare, business, information technology, and fashion and design” while
becoming eligible to receive federal student aid funds, thus allowing the Washington Post
Company a generous but precarious source of revenue.356
Ironically, as the test-prep industry branched into other educational markets, standardized
test manufacturers dallied with profitable arrangements. The nonprofit ETS entered into a tenyear contract with the for-profit Sylvan Learning Systems (“Sylvan”) in 1993. Sylvan would
serve as “the exclusive provider of computerized tests developed by the Educational Testing
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Service,” thus allowing ETS to better segue into providing computerized versions of its
standardized entrance and certification exams.357 However, Sylvan‟s own pattern of acquisitions
in the five-year period following its arrangement with ETS spurred the competing non-profit
ACT, Inc. (formerly the American College Testing Program) to file a series of suits. ACT
accused Sylvan of monopolistic behavior in the field of computer-based standardized testing.358
ACT‟s actions were not anomalous: the relationship between and among test-makers and
test-prep enterprises continued to maintain its litigious tint in the 1990s and new century. Most
notable was ETS‟s lawsuit against Kaplan. The test-maker accused the test-prep company of
fraud and malicious intent after Kaplan sent a group of employees to identify weaknesses in
ETS‟s computerized version of the Graduate Record Exam (“GRE”).359 In addition, Kaplan
found itself in suit with the Ronkin Educational Group. Ronkin, which controlled the College
Bound chain of tutoring centers in South Florida, sued Kaplan for unfair business practices after
College Bound was forced to declare bankruptcy.360 The former owners of College Bound,
George and Janet Ronkin, were later convicted of securities fraud.361
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The advent of the Internet placed Kaplan increasingly at odds with its main competitor.
Both Kaplan and The Princeton Review were embroiled in a lengthy battle of attrition over the
rights to certain Internet domain names. TPR had purchased domain names that Kaplan alleged
consumers would more reasonably associate with its own company, such as www.kaplan.com, in
order to redirect Internet traffic to the Princeton Review website.362 The dispute was taken to a
New York State arbitration panel, which “ruled that Princeton had to relinquish the [Internet]
address to Kaplan.”363 The Princeton Review and John Katzman were also embroiled in a dispute
with former TPR associate Adam Robinson, who alleged that the company continued to profit
from Robinson‟s work on TPR‟s commercially published test-prep books without giving
Robinson due compensation in the several years following his formal disassociation with the
company. Given Robinson‟s failure to establish that clear copyright infringement had occurred,
as well as his inability to demonstrate why a federal court would have subject matter jurisdiction
over such a dispute, Robinson‟s multimillion-dollar suit, and appeal four years later, were
dismissed.364
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Monetarily speaking, the expansion and growth of the test-prep industry during the past
two decades has been downright staggering, and increasingly premised on services outside of
test-prep‟s original milieu. Of the nearly $4.57 billion of the Washington Post Company‟s
reported revenue for its 2009 fiscal year, almost $2.64 billion came from Kaplan. However, over
58 percent of Kaplan‟s revenue stemmed from its online university, law school, and Higher
Education Campuses. Kaplan‟s Higher Education division generated over three times as much
revenue in 2009 as its Test-preparation division. Curiously, “approximately 83%, of total Kaplan
Higher Education revenues, and 49% of Kaplan, Inc. revenues,” or over one quarter of the
Washington Post Company‟s entire revenues for 2009, came from federal student loans and
grants.365 While The Princeton Review was not nearly as entangled in the ethicality of profiting
from federal student assistance, the company did branch into postsecondary education with its
late 2009, $176.2 million purchase of Penn Foster Education Group, which “provides accredited,
career-focused, online degree and vocational programs to more than 200,000 students”
globally.366
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